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ABSTRACT 
 The relationship between a firm’s human capital management and its performance is a 
topic of growing interest in recent years.  With the increasing role of technology and the rapid 
innovations in many industries, having highly skilled and knowledgeable employees is often 
necessary for success.  Firms make these investments in training and education, along with 
implementing various policies regarding employee involvement, improvement, satisfaction, and 
retention with the expectation that they will result in positive economic performance. This 
dissertation examines the economic value to firms of investing in the training of their employees.  
The primary research questions are: (1) whether firms benefit, financially, from investments in 
training and human capital, and (2) if firms do benefit, what are the firm-level factors that affect 
how much they benefit?   
 This dissertation contributes to the growing management literature on human capital by 
providing empirical tests that firm investments in human capital have a positive impact on 
economic performance, and by identifying firm-level factors that are complementary to these 
human capital investments.  To conduct these empirical tests, I first use event study methodology 
to obtain a measure of the economic impact of information regarding a firm’s human capital 
management investments and policies. Subsequent regression analyses are then used to test 
hypotheses regarding possible complementary relationships between firm-level factors and its 
human capital investments. Results of the event study provide robust support that training 
matters; significant abnormal returns are found at appropriate event windows for investments in 
human capital.  Subsequent analysis of the abnormal returns offers some but not unqualified 
support for the complementarity of investments in advertising, physical capital, and R&D as 
explaining the return to human capital.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Increased diffusion of information technology and globalization is leading to increased 
competition in many product markets.  As these product markets become more competitive, 
firms are less able to use industry analysis alone to identify sources of sustainable competitive 
advantage. According to the resource-based approach, a firm’s internal development of valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources become more likely sources of superior 
performance and competitive advantage (Barney, 1986, 1991; Grant, 1996; Penrose, 1959; 
Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). Thus, in this new competitive landscape, investments in 
knowledge and human capital are potential candidates for sustainable competitive advantage. 
The human capital embodied in employees – whether at the individual, team, or organizational 
level – is intangible and often tacit in nature.  In addition, this resource is often socially complex, 
and its relation to firm performance may be causally ambiguous, making imitation by 
competitors difficult (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990; Barney, 1991).  
Moreover, such intangible investments are especially likely to be a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage when the human capital is firm-specific. 
 Thus, over the past two decades, management research has become increasingly 
interested in the relationship between a firm’s human capital investments and its subsequent 
firm-level economic performance (Coff, 1997, 1999; Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Hitt, Hoskisson, 
Harrison, & Summers, 1994; Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009). In this dissertation I focus on two 
research questions: Do firms benefit financially from their investments in human capital?  If so, 
what factors affect the variability in their returns? 
 Regarding the first question, although there is growing interest in the benefits of firm 
investments in human capital, there is little empirical research that actually measures the 
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financial returns to firms of making these investments. This is primarily due to data limitations 
arising from difficulty with, and lack of, measurement. Actually measuring the exact levels of 
knowledge, know-how, skills and abilities of an employee is not something that can be done with 
great precision.  A more limiting factor, though, is that accounting profession conventions 
generally do not consider money spent on the training or education of employees to be an 
investment.  These actions are expensed in the year they are incurred, giving investors a less-
positive impression of short-term financial performance.1  In addition, there are few GAAP or 
FASB guidelines as to the reporting of these investments/expenses.  Firms are generally not 
required to give detailed explanations in financial statements, and if they do report training or 
education expenses at all, it is too often only a brief summary in a footnote to the annual report.  
These conditions make empirical management research in this area difficult, and often results in 
researchers having to resort to alternative performance measures, such as productivity or 
survival, instead of being able to directly measure the economic impact to firms of investing in 
human capital.  This dissertation attempts to address this issue by using event study methodology 
to obtain its dependent variable – abnormal stock market returns to firms following their 
placement on the annual “Training Top 125” award list published by Training Magazine. 
Additional variables are collected from Compustat and other sources before conducting 
regression analysis to test hypotheses regarding the value of human capital investments and their 
possible complementarity with other firm investments and decisions. 
Regarding the second question, given the novel measurement of economic performance 
derived from investments in human capital, this dissertation focuses on differential firm-level 
characteristics that enable us to explain and predict this economic performance variation.  A 
                                                            
1 For clear, illustrative examples demonstrating  how the “expensing” of intangibles can adversely affect a 
firm’s income statement and balance sheet, see Flamholtz (1985: 32-33). 
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firm’s physical capital investments, including, for example, new production machinery or new 
computer systems, may be complementary with investments in human capital, leading to 
increased economic performance.  If physical capital investments embody newer technologies, a 
firm is likely to have superior performance if it also invests in training the research employees 
expected to develop and implement new ideas related to this technology, and also if it trains the 
managerial and production employees operating in this organizational environment. In addition 
to high-tech physical capital investments, other physical capital investments may also be 
complementary with the firm’s investments in training employees.  Even basic information 
technology in the workplace requires ongoing training of employees for efficient operation. Also, 
from a production perspective, even machinery operated by entry-level employees will often 
have a computer interface and require the operator to set programs, take measurements and make 
adjustments.  A basic understanding of computers, measurement devices, and arithmetic will be 
necessary, and training on new production techniques and quality assurance procedures is also 
likely to be required. 
 Performance variation in response to training investments may also be explained by the 
existing human capital possessed by a firm’s employees. The new training may be 
complementary with both the general and specific components of an employee’s existing human 
capital, in part because the existing human capital provides absorptive capacity that allows the 
employee to more efficiently learn from new training (Becker, 1993: 51; Mowery & Oxley, 
1995; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  Additional explanations for the positive relationship between 
training and general human capital include that firm investments in general human capital serve 
to safeguard previous investments in firm-specific human capital (Hansson, 2002), and that the 
firm makes general human capital investments in an effort to increase employee psychic 
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commitment (Galunic & Anderson, 2000).  In each of these last two explanations, the intent is to 
reduce the turnover of skilled employees in which the firm has made previous investments.   
 Firm investments in intangible resources related to both R&D and Advertising have also 
been shown to have a positive impact on firm performance (Hall, 1992, 1993).  The know-how 
of R&D employees and the R&D capabilities the firm may develop as a result of these 
investments are valuable and inimitable resources.  And firms invest in advertising in an effort to 
both provide consumers with information and to differentiate themselves from the competition.  
As the firm is successful either in communicating the objective attributes of its products, or in 
generating a perceived differentiation in the mind of the consumer, it is able to move away from 
direct price competition.  Also, product differentiation may create a long-run barrier to entry 
(Carlton & Perloff, 2005: 80).   
 There are entry barrier-based, resource-based, and information-based (measurement 
difficulties, accounting conventions, signaling) reasons to expect physical capital, R&D, and 
advertising investments to be potential sources of economic profit, particularly when these 
investments are made in concert with consistent human capital management policies and 
practices that emphasize employee training.  In order for these potential sources of economic 
profit to be realized, at least three other conditions must be met. The firm will need to manage its 
investments in human capital, physical capital, R&D, and advertising by efficiently structuring, 
bundling, and leveraging these resources and capabilities in an effort to create value (Sirmon, 
Hitt, & Ireland, 2007).  Or, put differently, the firm must (1) identify, (2) select, and then           
(3) develop, enhance and protect assets and skills2 that are a source of sustainable competitive 
                                                            
2 Aaker (1989) uses the term “skills” at the firm level, not individual level.  He uses it to mean what we 
would today refer to as capabilities.  Also, Aaker’s (1989) first two steps (identify, select) align with 
Sirmon et al.’s (2007) structuring, while his third step (develop, enhance, protect) approximates Sirmon 
et al.’s (2007) bundling and leveraging. 
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advantage (Aaker, 1989).  Basically, the firm must pull each “lever” correctly as it attempts to 
create value with a particular human capital management strategy. Then, assuming value has 
been created, the firm must concern itself with the appropriation of that value. 
 This dissertation proceeds as follows.  First, I provide a literature review of germane 
research streams including those in strategic management, human resources, technology 
adoption, and management research on rent appropriation.  Second, theory is developed that 
explains when and if firms benefit financially from their investments in human capital.  
Additional theory is developed to explain what factors affect the variability in their returns.  In 
the fourth chapter, data and research design are explained and data sources are identified, and 
variables are defined.  In the fifth chapter, results are reported and discussed.  The sixth and 
concluding chapter offers a discussion of implications for theory and practice, limitations of the 
study, and opportunities for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Prior research has examined whether firms benefit from investments in human capital.  In 
this section of the dissertation I will review prior research from strategic management, human 
resources, and technology adoption, along with reviewing management research concerning the 
ability of firms to appropriate returns from their human capital investments.  
To facilitate this discussion I find it helpful to first define a few key concepts. 
 
Definitions 
  
Human Capital 
 Early definitions of human capital were broader than is common today.  Gary Becker 
defined human capital as arising from activities – primarily formal education and on-the-job 
training, but also including investments in medical care, migration, and searching for information 
– that influence future monetary and/or psychic income by increasing the resources in people.  
These resources included not only the skills and knowledge of individuals, but also their health 
(1964: 1) and values (1993: 16). I follow the convention in most current research of limiting my 
focus to those activities – primarily formal education, and various forms of on-the-job training 
and experience – that influence future productive and monetary value.  While most employees 
are likely to have or develop skills or knowledge3 of enduring value in their occupations, in 
situations where completely unskilled labor is required, this will be considered “labor” and not 
human capital.   
                                                            
3 Throughout this dissertation, when using the word “knowledge” to describe a result of investing in 
human capital, I include explicit knowledge, along with “know how” and other forms of tacit knowledge 
possessed by an individual.   
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General Human Capital (GHC)  
 Investments in general human capital are those which would be equally valuable if 
employed at another firm.  Therefore, in a competitive labor market, competition for this capital 
should lead to the employee receiving a wage representative of their marginal product; firms will 
compete and bid up the wage of this employee until the cost is equal to the benefit.  Employees 
are receptive to this form of training, while firms will generally only provide this training at the 
employee’s expense.   
 
Firm-Specific Human Capital (FSHC)  
 
 This form of human capital is more valuable at the current firm than it would be if 
redeployed at another firm.  There is a specific, idiosyncratic, and sometimes tacit nature to this 
capital that is valuable to the current employer, but difficult to market and redeploy in other 
firms.  This capital may be accumulated through experience, or through on-the-job training that 
is generally paid for by the employer.  The employee is expected to receive a wage higher than 
they could receive from other firms in the outside labor market, but lower than the actual value 
(marginal product) of their capital to the firm.  In some sense, employees and employers share 
the returns to this capital based upon bargaining power. 
 
Physical Capital 
  
 This capital consists of plant, equipment, machinery and other tangible investments that 
are at least somewhat durable in nature and can be used in the production of the firm’s goods and 
services.  The term “physical” is used to distinguish this type of capital from financial or human 
capital.  Also, not all physical assets are defined as “capital.”  Assets in inventory and goods 
intended for sale do not count.  Last, highly depreciable assets that will not be around in future 
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time periods to generate returns are defined by accountants and in this dissertation as “expenses” 
not capital. 
 
Resources 
 
 Barney (1991) defines “strategically relevant” resources as “assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, and knowledge controlled by a firm that 
enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and 
effectiveness” (p.101).  He notes that these resources can be classified into the three categories of 
physical (including technology), human, and organizational capital resources.  Wernerfelt (1984) 
defines resources as “those (tangible and intangible) assets which are semi-permanently tied to 
the firm” (p.172), and emphasizes the importance of resources related to: brands and customer 
loyalty; knowledge of technology; employee skills (including technological, production, and 
managerial); efficient procedures; economies of scale and machine capacity; and domestic and 
international trade contacts.  When managing the resource portfolio (the levels and proportions 
of these resources), Wernerfelt (1984) notes the need to focus on both the balancing of these 
resources in the short term, and the ability of the portfolio to contribute to the development of 
additional skills and capabilities that will allow additional business expansion in the longer term.   
 Wernerfelt (1989) focuses on those “critical resources” that can “differentiate you from 
the competition” (p.5), and in effect, suggests that unique resources be identified where there is 
an opportunity for quasi rents, due either to team effects or to specific assets of suppliers or 
employees. Amit and Schoemaker (1993) identify “strategic assets” as those that are firm-
specific (and likely to be intangible, or “invisible,” and tacit) and complementary with other 
strategic assets.  The extent to which rents are realized will depend also on the relevance of these 
strategic assets to the particular industry setting, and the ability of management to overcome 
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decision-making biases caused by uncertainty, complexity, and conflict when attempting to 
develop and deploy these assets. 
 
Intangible Assets 
 
Intangible assets, as opposed to tangible assets of the firm, have no physical substance 
and are likely to be more difficult to measure and value than tangible assets such as a firm’s 
property or equipment.  Yet these intangible assets, which include knowledge and skills of 
employees, organizational capabilities, corporate reputation, customer loyalty, long-term 
relationships with buyers or suppliers, technological know-how, and forms of intellectual 
property, are said to be increasingly likely sources of potential competitive advantage for firms.  
Intangible assets including human capital, R&D and marketing-related investments have been 
shown to impact firm performance (Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Hall, 1992, 1993).   
Hall (1992) categorizes these resources according to whether they are “people 
dependent” (know-how: of employees, suppliers, distributors; perceptions of quality, ability to 
learn, and the reputation of product and company) or “people independent.” “People 
independent” resources included trademarks, patents, copyrights, registered designs, supply 
contracts, trade secrets, and databases.  Although generally following accounting conventions of 
reserving the term “asset” for those resources which are separable (to facilitate valuation) and 
possess the characteristic of “belongingness” (136), these findings and conclusions show the 
lasting value to the firm of these “people dependent” resources and would appear to satisfy at 
least a basic accounting definition of an asset: “economic resources with the ability or potential 
to provide future benefits” (Stickney & Weil, 2003: 10).  The three intangible resources rated 
most important to business success by the executives in Hall’s (1992) survey were: Company 
Reputation, Product Reputation, and Employee Know-how.  These same three resources also 
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happen to have the longest “replacement period,” or time required for depreciation.  Reputation 
was estimated by executives to depreciate in 10.8 years, Product Reputation in 6.0 years, and 
Employee Know-how in 4.6 years.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I adopt an inclusive 
view of Intangible Assets, which is consistent with the perspective taken in most current 
management research.  I include the above “people dependent” and “people independent” items 
and require only that the asset be expected to provide benefits beyond the current time period 
(year).4 5 
 Expenditures in the intangible assets I examine in this dissertation (human capital, and 
R&D and marketing-related expenditures) are often irrecoverable and are made at the firm’s 
discretion.  These investment decisions managers make generate the sunk costs and commitment 
that is said to be a necessary condition for sustained economic profits.  These decisions are 
strategic in nature, and the assets that are acquired or developed are prime examples of the 
“strategic assets” many in strategic management have argued are important sources of 
competitive advantage and economic profits.   
 
Strategic Assets  
 
In addition to my emphasis on human capital as an important strategic asset of the firm, I 
also include a measure of physical capital, and also the intangible assets resulting from firm 
investments in both R&D and advertising.  Winter (1987) notes that an organizations strategy 
may be viewed as “a summary account of the principal characteristics and relationships of the 
                                                            
4 I follow Hirschey & Weygandt’s (1985) “market value perspective,” which asks only whether the 
expenditure or resource in question would have a positive impact on the market value of the firm.  If so, 
the expenditure should be treated for accounting purposes as an intangible asset and amortized over its 
useful life (p.327).   
 
5 See the examples of Conventional vs. Human Resource (the human resources here being treated as 
intangible assets) income statements, and Conventional vs. Human Resource balance sheets in Flamholtz 
(1985: 32-33). 
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organization and its environment – an account developed for the purpose of informing decisions 
affecting the organization’s success and survival” (p.160).  This “summary account” is one of 
state variables not amenable to change in the short term, and includes the conventionally 
recognized tangible assets, as well as things “not so recognized, at least in financial accounting” 
such as “stocks of customers, employees, advertising, and R&D capital” (p.163). 
 
Inclusion of Physical Capital 
 
I include a measure of physical capital (intensity) as a “strategic asset” of interest in my 
dissertation, as it is consistent with Winter’s (1987) conception of strategic assets defined above, 
and because the ability of human capital and other intangible assets to generate value for the firm 
occurs through their interaction with the firm’s tangible assets (Penrose, 1959: 78-79; Hart, 
1995: 58-59).   
With these definitions in place I begin the literature review on human capital. 
 
Human Capital and Performance articles 
Several literatures exist that are concerned with issues regarding returns to human capital.  
To narrow the focus, I chose to review four significant strands of literature that have direct 
bearing on the research questions.  One set of studies has examined human capital using the tools 
of strategic management, and has primarily emphasized empirical work.  A second set of studies, 
broadly viewed as from a strategic HR perspective, also emphasizes empirical work and often 
uses tools similar to those in strategic management.  The perspective here is different, though, in 
that the focus, at least historically, has often been on the functional responsibilities of the HR 
department and not overall firm performance.  Or, when the perspective is more strategic, overall 
firm strategy is generally taken as a given, and HR policies are developed that aid firm 
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performance by being supportive of existing firm strategy.  A third set of studies, from the 
information and communication technology (ICT) adoption literature, has examined the 
complementarities of skills, information technology, and organizational structure, and has used 
primarily economic tools.  This literature is relevant both because its questions use similar 
measures and metrics and because it offers some insight into the question of fit which dominates 
most discussions of the strategy-performance relationship. In the final section of the literature 
review, I consider the developing management research dealing with issues of rent appropriation.  
As explained in this research literature, the same properties that make human capital investments 
attractive from a resource-based perspective also make it possible that some rents will be 
appropriated by stakeholders such as employees and therefore not apparent in financial measures 
of firm performance.   
 
The Strategic Management Perspective 
 
Strategic management scholars have been increasingly interested in the relationship 
between firm investments in human capital and performance over the past two decades.  This 
interest is due, in part, to the increasing relevance of human capital in a knowledge-based 
economy.  Also, over this same time period, the Resource-Based View has gained prominence 
among management researchers.  The Resource-Based View suggests that internal resources and 
capabilities are more likely to be sources of competitive advantage than strategies based on 
industry positioning.  Strategy scholars who adopt the RBV perspective often propose that firm 
investments in human capital – the knowledge, skills and abilities of its employees – is an 
increasingly important, perhaps even primary, source of potential advantage for firms.  Although 
strategy scholars have considered the role of human capital in a variety of contexts, including its 
relation to CEO/TMT performance (Harris & Helfat, 1997; Bailey & Helfat, 2003), 
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diversification (Farjoun, 1994, 1998; Wang & Barney, 2006), governance (Wang, He, & 
Mahoney, 2009), innovation (Marvel & Lumpkin, 2007) and entrepreneurship (Cooper, Gimeno-
Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997), relatively less work has 
examined the effects of firm investments in training and educating employees on firm 
performance.  I now review this limited literature below. 
Hatch and Dyer (2004) examined the effects of human capital investments on learning 
performance in semiconductor manufacturing. This empirical study finds that selection activities, 
training, and deployment all had the ability to improve learning performance (measured by rate 
of defects). It emphasizes the ability of firm-specific human capital to provide competitive 
advantage over rivals, due to its ability to improve learning performance and its inimitable 
nature.  This study is a useful building block for this dissertation because of its various training 
measures, all noted to represent investments in firm-specific human capital, and the finding that 
these measures have a significant impact on a measure of performance – learning by doing. 
 Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, and Kochhar (2001) examined both the direct and moderating 
effects of human capital on the strategy and performance of large law firms. This study finds that 
human capital moderates the relationship between strategy and performance, lending support to a 
contingency approach, as opposed to a universal approach, to human capital investments.  The 
financial performance measure in this study of large, and privately-held, law firms is derived 
from data collected by survey and reported in American Lawyer, and performance is measured 
by net income to total revenue, a measure intended to be similar to return on sales for public 
firms.  The paper’s finding of a curvilinear relationship between human capital and performance 
is relevant to this dissertation, as it shows that, although there are benefits to investing in human 
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capital, these benefits are sometimes costly.  It may take time for a new partner to develop the 
tacit knowledge and managerial skills needed to complement their intellectual capabilities. 
 Kor and Leblebici (2005) examine interdependencies among human capital deployment, 
development, and diversification strategies of large law firms, and how these interdependencies 
affect performance. This empirical study finds that leveraging firm-specific human capital results 
in higher financial performance when performed alone, but not when the firm attempts to 
simultaneously pursue both geographic and service diversification. The more general human 
capital gained through hiring new law school graduates enabled growth and lateral knowledge 
that assisted with diversification. Financial performance is measured by “profitability per 
partner,” a self-reported measure collected by survey intended to be similar to return on equity of 
public firms. This study is a useful building block for this dissertation because it finds inter-
dependencies between the business-level strategies of service and geographic diversification, and 
the HR strategies of human capital development and leveraging.  Human capital is shown to have 
value and be a potential source of competitive advantage, and returns are found to be superior 
when there is a “strategic fit” between the various levels of strategies. 
 Carmeli and Tishler (2004) maintain that there has been a lack of research examining the 
relationship between core strategic resources and activities, and organizational performance, and  
attempt to fill this research gap by measuring the impact of human capital and other intangible 
organizational elements (managerial capabilities, internal auditing, labor relations, organizational 
culture, and perceived organizational reputation) on organizational performance measures of 
local government authorities in Israel.  This study shows the applicability of the resource-based 
view to a public-sector setting and finds human capital to have a positive effect on organizational 
performance (a measure of income generated by the local authority, and also their efficiency in 
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collecting that income). It also finds that the intangible organizational elements measured 
complement each other - “the ‘marginal productivity’ of each organizational element is higher 
the higher are the values of all other organizational elements” (p.1271). 
From this section of the literature review, we see that firm investments in human capital 
affect the relationship between business-level strategy and measures of firm performance.  
Various productivity-related measures, including learning, are positively associated with human 
capital investments.  Also, certain financial performance measures of both privately-held firms 
and public sector organizations are shown to be positively associated with human capital 
investments. And, in certain situations, firm-specific human capital may be a source of 
competitive advantage.   
What remains to be answered is whether or not these generally non-financial measures of 
performance have any relationship with changes in a firm’s financial performance.  Additional 
work is also still needed to identify the variables that may be affecting the degree of any 
relationship between human capital and firm financial performance.  In addition to identifying 
the types of other investments that human capital investments complement, the relationship 
between the specificity of the human capital investments and the specificity of the other strategic 
investments is a largely unexamined area.  Complicating matters somewhat is that, ideally, these 
issues of specificity would need to be examined concurrently with issues involving the 
complementarity of human capital and other strategic investments. 
 
HR Perspective 
 
From HRM to SHRM and Human Capital Management  
 
The next literature I review is that of Strategic Human Resources.  I start with a brief 
overview of how the Human Resources field has evolved over the past few decades to have a 
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more strategic focus that often explicitly emphasizes the development and management of 
human capital.  Early human resource management research, sometimes referred to as “personnel 
management,” often had a sub-functional level of analysis and focused, for example, on ways in 
which recruitment, selection, and compensation activities supported behavioral control and 
coordination goals of the HR department.  Aside from key personnel, most employees were 
considered homogenous labor that needed to be fit to specialized, but highly standardized, jobs.  
Executives valued having interchangeable (and replaceable) workers, and were known to 
substitute physical capital for labor as a way of “taking human resources out of the strategy 
equation” (Snell, Shadur, & Wright, 2001: 627).   
 In the 1980’s, researchers began to consider the importance of internal fit, where the 
practices bundled together and performed in support of a particular HR sub-function needed to 
be consistent with and reinforce each other. For example, HR selection activities such as 
recruitment, achievement testing, and assessment should all be consistent with the firm’s 
selection goals.  Also, the practices performed in support of one HR sub-function (such as 
selection) need to be consistent with the practices performed in support of other HR sub-
functions (such as training) (Wright & Snell, 1991: 215).  With this growing awareness of the 
synergies that existed between the various HR sub-functions (such as training, selection, and 
compensation) came configurational research proposing that there were sets of best practices that 
would lead to “high commitment” or “high performance” work systems that would perform well 
in all situations.6 
                                                            
6 Distinctions between universalistic, configurational, and contingent perspectives are not clear and 
agreed-upon in the literature.  For instance, Delery and Doty (1996) note all three perspectives as being 
relevant to HR research, while Youndt, Snell, Dean, and Lepak (1996) state that the two primary 
perspectives within HR research are “universal” and “contingent” (p.837).  Also, close configurational – 
universalistic (Snell, Shadur, & Wright, 2001: 632), and configurational –contingent (Delery & Doty, 
1996: 812-813) relationships have been noted in the literature.  I find the primary distinction to be 
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 The field of Strategic Human Resource Management emerges as researchers begin to 
examine the relationship between HR practices and overall firm performance (external fit).  
Much of the early research was configurational, but more recent work has also considered 
contingency perspectives where different sets of HR practices are expected to perform well when 
matched to particular business strategies.  Research to date has found support for universal 
(Huselid, 1995) configurational (MacDuffie, 1995) and contingent perspectives (Youndt, Snell, 
Dean, & Lepak, 1996; Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001). 
 While early Strategic Human Resource Management research considered how individual 
and bundled HR practices affected firm performance, it often did not emphasize the importance 
of developing and maintaining human capital in the workforce.  As the U.S. and other 
industrialized nations transformed to knowledge-based economies, and as global competition 
increased, this began to change.  Firms began to realize that the knowledge, technical skills, and 
innovative ideas of their employees were an important source of competitive advantage.  
Research from the emerging resource-based view of the firm suggested that this intangible 
resource was scarce and difficult for competitors to imitate, making it a potential source of 
sustainable competitive advantage.  In support of their position that HR managers should adopt 
the perspective of human capital managers, Becker, Huselid, Pickus, and Spratt (1997: 44) state: 
 The concept of human capital management emphasizes the essential point that a firm’s 
 human resources and subsequently its HRM system can be more than a cost to be 
 minimized.  A firm’s human resources have an asset value that corresponds to the present 
 value of future cash flows that are derived from the skills, motivation, and adaptability of 
 the firm’s workforce.  It requires that both the CEO and CHRO share a focus on one 
 essential question:  How do we architect a human capital strategy that is aligned with 
 business priorities and capable of rapidly adapting to a shifting competitive landscape?”   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
between whether HR-firm performance relationships are universal in nature, or whether the HR activities, 
whether considered in isolation or in bundles, have a contingent relationship with firm performance.  I 
adopt a generally contingent perspective.  But, similar to the configurational perspective, I do note the 
importance of both internal and external fit.  I do not, however, accept the assertion of equifinality 
associated with the configurational perspective (Delery & Doty, 1996: 812). 
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Investing in human capital can create value for the firm because this resource is properly 
viewed as capital (Schultz, 1960: 571; 1961: 1); investments will have productive value and 
generate returns in future periods.  From a resource-based perspective, this intangible and often 
tacit resource has properties that make it difficult for competitors to imitate or substitute for, 
which allows for the possibility of a sustainable competitive advantage.  Also, as managers make 
these investment decisions in a manner consistent with the firm’s overall business strategy, they 
will be more valuable. When human capital investments are employed in concert with a 
particular strategy, they are used in combination with other tangible and intangible resources of 
the firm.  It is the consistency between these human capital investments and other firm resources 
that allows the firm’s human capital investments, and business strategy, to be successful. 
 Having described how HR research has evolved to have what is often a more strategic 
orientation that views the value of human resource investments as being contingent on their fit 
with overall firm strategy, I now review representative articles from this research below. 
Strategic HR 
Youndt, Snell, Dean, and Lepak (1996) examined whether there was a universal or 
contingent relationship between human resources and performance, and found that, although a 
direct effect did exist, the relationship was predominantly due to the moderating effect of a 
plant’s manufacturing strategy (cost, quality, or flexibility).  A human-capital-enhancing strategy 
had a positive effect on performance when a quality manufacturing strategy was also in place. 
 Chadwick (2006) examined how the effects of a firm’s human capital acquisition 
strategies (make vs. buy) affected organizational performance in both manufacturing and service 
sectors, and finds evidence that the relation between a particular acquisition strategy and 
performance is contingent upon the organization’s strategy (differentiation, low cost, quality).  
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This is one of very few studies to consider the effects of physical capital intensity in the human 
capital – performance relationship, although it is only used as a control variable.  
Within HR research, work has been done that examines both determinants of training, 
and also effects of employer-provided training on firm performance.  Hansson (2007) finds a 
positive association between the provision of training and company analyses of training needs, 
the existence of a written training policy, and the education level of employees.  A negative 
association was found between training provided and the use of an internal labor market and the 
degree of unionization. Hansson (2009) notes that market failures may be resulting in an under-
investment in training, and concludes that an often overlooked aspect of human capital 
management is the leadership skills of management.  It’s not enough that employees be trained, 
but the organization must also develop the capability in its management to “take full advantage” 
of the improved employee skills (p.4). 
 In a related work, Lynch and Black (1998) examined the effects of various employer 
characteristics on the likelihood of employer-provided training.  Although this study does not 
examine the relationship between human capital and firm performance, it is relevant for its 
examination of both human and physical capital.  Lynch and Black note: “the way in which 
employer investments in human capital are related to investments in physical capital is not clear 
a priori” (1998, p.66), and find that employer-provided training complements both investments 
in physical capital, and the education level of employees. 
In summary, the HR perspective examines how human resource departments can become 
more effective in accomplishing their functional-level goals (such as attracting and selecting 
employees) and how they may perform these functional-level goals more efficiently.  From a 
more strategic HR perspective, the relationship between HR policies and the success of firm-
20 
 
level strategy is considered.  In examining the relationship between human capital development 
or acquisition strategies and performance, this literature generally finds a contingent relationship 
where firm-level strategy moderates the human capital-performance relationship.  What remains 
to be answered is how strategic HR policies affecting the recruitment, training and education, 
and motivation of employees interact with firm strategy to affect firm performance.  Firm 
strategy has been shown here to moderate the success of human capital development or 
acquisition strategies.  But, if firm-level strategy is exogenous to the HR personnel making 
human capital investment decisions, then how can the appropriate human capital investment 
decisions be made? 
 
The Information Technology Perspective 
  
Additional insights are gained from questions that are asked in the research literature on 
information technology and corporate change.  This literature does not focus on physical capital 
investments in general, but instead emphasizes a subset of physical capital investments – 
information and/or communication technology (IT or ICT) investments, as well as examines the 
relationships between these technological investments, the composition of the workforce, and the 
structure of the organization.  Often, questions surrounding the possibility of either Skill-Biased 
Technological Change (SBTC) or Skill-Biased Organizational Change (SBOC) are examined.  A 
few recent papers have even considered the possibility of 3-way complementarity7 among 
                                                            
7 I follow the definition of complementarity used by Milgrom and Roberts (1992), which notes that the 
standard definition of complementarity in economics is market oriented – two inputs in a production 
process are said to be complements if a decrease in the price of one causes an increase in the demand for 
the other.  In order to be able to employ the concept of complementarity usefully to examine choices of 
levels of various internal activities as well as levels of input purchases Milgrom and Roberts (1992) 
introduce “an alternative, more inclusive, definition:  Several activities are mutually complementary if 
doing more of any one activity increases (or at least does not decrease) the marginal profitability of each 
other activity in the group.” (p.108). See also Milgrom and Roberts (1990: 514). 
21 
 
technological investments, skills of employees, and organizational change, although with 
conflicting results. 
 Giuri, Torrisi, and Zinovyeva (2008) examine the possibility of both 2-way and 3-way 
complementarities between Information and Communication Technology (ICT) investments, 
skills, and organizational change in 680 small to medium-sized Italian manufacturing firms over 
the 1995-2003 time period. This empirical study finds 2-way complementarity between skills 
and organizational changes such as decentralization of authority, de-layering, teamwork, and job 
rotation. However, it does not find evidence of 2-way complementarity between ICT investments 
and skills of employees, and there is no evidence of 2-way complementarity between ICT 
investments and the implementation of modern organizational practices. Lastly, this study finds 
no evidence of 3-way complementarity.  In fact, organizational changes have a negative effect on 
the productivity gains from joint adoption of ICT and human capital. This 3-way finding is likely 
due to higher coordination costs of attempting multiple changes simultaneously, and highlights a 
tension between stability and modification of organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
 Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) provide some of the most well-known research 
in this area (see also Bresnahan, 1999; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000).  Bresnahan et al. note that: 
“In principle, IT could be a complement or substitute for skilled labor depending on how the 
technology is used” (1992: 344).  This study also maintains, however, that there will be only 
limited substitution of skilled labor with IT, perhaps for routine tasks such as record-keeping or 
simple calculations.  More complex tasks requiring cognitive, visual, or spatial abilities will 
continue to be performed by skilled employees.  In addition, this study hypothesizes a 
complementarity between IT and skilled labor due to the information overload they say occurs.  
The increased implementation of IT and computerization results in a greater production of data.  
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Skilled workers are then needed to analyze this data.  Furthermore, this study maintains that 
since information availability increases at a rate faster than the firm’s workforce can be 
modified, organizational changes that distribute the information processing tasks will have a 
complementary effect.     
The primary hypotheses are that there is a complementary relationship at the firm level 
between labor demand behavior and (i) computerization; (ii) computer-enabled organizational 
change; and (iii) new computer-enabled forms of output (innovative new products and services).  
The “cluster” of (i) – (iii) above are emphasized; IT is more likely to be effective in 
organizations with a higher quality output mix, decentralized decision making, and more skilled 
workers (p.346).  Results show that skilled labor is complementary with this cluster of changes. 
Also, technical change is found to positively influence the demand for skilled employees both 
directly, and also through the skill-biased organizational changes (SBOC) induced by the 
technical changes. 
Similarly, Allyn and Yun (2005) find the use of technology to have both direct and 
indirect effects on wage rates.  Using data from 4 Bureau of Labor Statistics surveys conducted 
over the 1989-2001 time period, this study examined both the direct effect of various computer 
applications on pay, and also the mediating effects that computer use had on the relationship 
between both human capital and pay, and between job characteristics and pay.  In addition, this 
study finds direct relationships between human capital and pay, and between job characteristics 
and pay. This study also finds that computer usage, human capital variables, and job 
characteristics each had a direct effect on pay, and that the relationships between human capital 
and pay, and between job characteristics and pay, were mediated by computer use applications.  
Lastly, it should be noted that the findings regarding the direct effect of computer applications on 
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pay support the notion that implementation of this technology (a form of physical capital) has 
both substitute and complementary relationships with human capital. For managerial, technical, 
and administrative activities computer usage is associated with wage gains, while for more 
mundane clerical applications computer usage is associated with wage losses.  Computers 
potentiate the value of human capital, raising or lowering its value depending on the specific 
applications – “In order to maximize the value of the computer in the productivity equation, 
human capital (and job characteristics) must be in alignment” (2005: 48).   
 Fabiani, Schivardi and Trento (2005) present a study from the technology adoption 
literature, which emphasizes not whether technology was adopted, but the rate at which adoption 
occurred.  This study uses a survey of 1,500 Italian manufacturing firms interviewed in 2001 to 
examine factors at both the firm level, and at the level of the local industrial environment, which 
influence the speed of adoption of information and communication technologies (ICT).  At the 
firm level, firm size and the human capital of the workforce are important determinants of ICT 
adoption.  At the level of the local environment, firms located in areas with a dense population of 
firms and with a strong presence of large firms are more likely to use organizational 
technologies, such as intranet or enterprise resource planning systems. Fabiani, Schivardi, and 
Trento (2005) conclude that a more flexible workforce with enhanced human capital will be 
necessary to “speed diffusion and maximize returns” (p.246).   
From this research literature, we see that complementarities exist between skill levels of 
employees and certain technological changes, and between skill levels and certain organizational 
changes.  There may also be a 3-way interaction among skills, technology, and organizational 
structure.   
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As with the other literatures reviewed, this research literature also often uses productivity 
to measure performance, but there need not be a positive relationship between productivity and 
financial performance.  Strategy should consider financial performance.  Also, are “skills” 
equivalent to “human capital,” or does any distance between these two terms lead to additional 
questions?  Certainly, skills are part of an employee’s human capital, but omission of other 
components of human capital (including know-how, teamwork, knowledge of organization, other 
tacit knowledge) is likely to be affecting the empirical results.  Also, how would consideration of 
the specificity of these skills affect the complementarities between skills, technology, and 
organizational structure?  Further, how are measures of technology and organizational structure 
used in this literature related to measures of firm strategy and strategic investments such as R&D 
and advertising used in the Strategy and Strategic HR literatures? 
 
Appropriation 
 
Can firms appropriate returns from their training and human capital investments?  The 
value to firms of human capital investments is in part determined by how well firms are able to 
appropriate returns.  Hence a fourth strand of relevant research literature for inclusion in this 
review includes whether and how firms can appropriate returns. 
 Although economists, including those from Industrial Organization (Porter, 1979, 1980) 
and Organizational Economics (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1975, 1985) 
have been concerned with bargaining power and appropriation-related issues for some time now, 
and although management research has considered appropriation in contexts including top 
management’s ability to appropriate economic rents when faced with diffuse stockholders 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 1992), and in an innovative firm’s ability to “capture” or appropriate 
(before other current or potential competitors can do so) returns to innovative output (Tripsas, 
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1997; Teece, 1986), it was not until more recently that resource-based management research 
began to take a critical look at the ability of internal stakeholders (primarily employees) to 
appropriate rents that were, in the past, assumed to accrue to the firm and be visible in financial 
statements. 
 Coff (1997) provides an early resource-based paper that focuses on the difficulties firms 
face in actually improving performance following investments in human assets.  Although this 
paper focuses primarily on the generation of advantage, as opposed to the appropriation of any 
rents that may arise as a result of improved performance, it is nevertheless relevant to this review 
of the appropriation literature.  The framework developed clearly illustrates how certain human 
asset attributes, while attractive from an RBV perspective as potential sources of competitive 
advantage, may cause difficulties for managers attempting to actually generate this advantage.  
These same basic human asset attributes causing dilemmas for managers as they attempt to 
generate advantage will later be shown to cause similar dilemmas for managers as they attempt 
to appropriate rents that may arise following the generation of an advantage.  These dilemmas 
are related to the threat of turnover and information problems.  Human assets can quit, demand 
higher pay, reject authority, and shirk. The framework considers factors that allow human assets 
to be strategic, the associated dilemmas, and provides suggested coping strategies for managers.   
 In this framework, the degree of asset specificity is one attribute that may allow human 
assets to be strategic, but it also creates dilemmas related to the threat of turnover. Coff (1997) 
proposes three coping strategies here: (1) an emphasis on retention, through job satisfaction;    
(2) providing firm-specific pay to employees; and (3) through the provision and development of 
skills in employees.  Social Complexity and causal ambiguity may also allow human assets to be 
strategic, but come with information dilemmas including adverse selection (during hiring), moral 
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hazard (motivational difficulties), and bounded rationality. Coff (1997) proposes coping 
strategies here including rent sharing with employees, organizational design changes, and 
acquiring additional information, about current employees and the labor market. 
After developing the 1997 framework, Coff (1999) begins to directly examine the 
appropriation of rents. The same features of assets (firm specificity, causal ambiguity, social 
complexity) that may give a firm competitive advantage may also allow internal stakeholders to 
appropriate the rent.8  RBV and bargaining power literature are combined to predict when rent 
will be generated, and who will appropriate it. The firm is not a unitary actor – it must be 
decomposed into its various stakeholders.  There is a two-stage game: (1) rent is generated, and 
(2) rent is appropriated. This paper provides a new way to view/measure competitive advantage.  
Competitive advantage is defined as the total rents generated by the firm.  The firm is defined as 
a nexus of contracts, and these total rents are defined as “nexus rents.”  Some rents may be 
appropriated by internal stakeholders and will, therefore, not be visible in financial statements.  
To predict when rent will be visible in (financial) performance measures, we need to understand 
both what resources generate rent, and who has bargaining power to appropriate rent.  
 When considering employees as a stakeholder capable of appropriating rents, Coff (1999: 
128) explains that they may increasingly have (property) rights to a portion of the rents: 
Increasingly, human assets have the greatest potential to generate rent even in the 
corporate form … In a knowledge-based economy, property rights may be increasingly 
ambiguous, and the production team may correctly claim rights to residuals (emphasis 
added) 
 
Whether or not these employees will successfully be able to make these claims and receive a 
portion of the residuals will be influenced by a few key factors affecting the bargaining power of 
both employees and management:  (1) are the employees capable of unified action?  How about 
                                                            
8 Earlier resource-based papers acknowledging this issue include those by Wernerfelt (1989), and 
particularly Grant (1991: 128-129). 
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the managers? (2) Do the employees have access to relevant company information? (3) Will it be 
costly to the firm if this stakeholder leaves? And (4) How costly would it be for the employees to 
leave (can they make a credible threat of leaving when negotiating for a portion of the rents)? 
 Coff (2003b) explores the intersection of management and economics in the strategic 
management literature, particularly with regards to knowledge-based advantages. This study 
examines the similarities and differences between the two fields (Management and Economics) 
as they seek to answer three questions: (1) what is the source of an advantage? (2) What 
determines the sustainability of an advantage? And (3) what are the factors that predict the rent 
appropriation patterns from a competitive advantage? 
      Management literature answers the first question by stating that it is a firm’s unique 
resources and capabilities that provide an advantage. Furthermore, knowledge is often an 
important component of these resources and capabilities, and it is a firm’s ability to create, 
recombine, and transfer knowledge that provides an advantage.  Bounded rationality is a critical 
assumption here, since without it all firms would be able to handle these issues equally well, and 
there would be no advantage.  While much of Economics typically assumes a higher degree of 
rationality than the Strategy literature does, Coff (2003b) notes that the areas of Economics that 
intersect with Management (including Human Capital9 research) do assume bounded rationality.  
These areas of Economics view advantage as arising from a firm’s ability to make competitive 
moves, acquire and manage human capital, and design efficient production processes.   
                                                            
9 While Becker (1962b) allows that there are costs to gaining information or transacting, and that there is 
uncertainty, for example in whether an employee will quit or be terminated after receiving training, this 
study also generally proposes that decision makers will make rational decisions, given these constraints.  
The study also proposes that irrational behavior (i.e., impulsive or habitual) is more likely to be observed 
at the individual or household level of analysis.  According to Becker (1962b), irrational behavior will be 
constrained by an individual’s opportunity set.  Budgetary constraints and downward-sloping demand 
curves limit irrational behavior.  Also, any deviations from rationality at the individual level are said to be 
“smoothed” (p.13) when taken as a group “implying rationality at the market level” (p.2).  
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      In answering the second question (sustainability), the Management literature focuses on 
attributes of knowledge that hinder transfer and imitation.  The lack of a competitive factor 
market is important here, since, without it, factors would be easily traded at their full value and 
would not confer an advantage.  The Economics literature, on the other hand, focuses on industry 
structure, along with factors in the institutional environment (patents, IP protection) as factors 
that lead to sustainability of an advantage.  Interestingly, the Strategy literature highlights the 
benefits of tacit knowledge, while the Economics literature also focuses on the need to codify, 
and then protect, knowledge. 
      The Economics literature addresses the third question (appropriability) largely by 
focusing on bargaining power that arises from asset ownership, asset specificity, monitoring 
costs, and incentives.  The Management literature addresses this question by exploring the 
implications of coalitions, unique information, switching costs, networks, and political power.  
Similarities exist in that both Management and Economic analyses rest on underlying 
assumptions of bounded rationality and asymmetric information.  While Management literature 
has concerned itself more with rent generation, the Economics literature has been more 
concerned with rent appropriation.  Clearly, both areas need to be addressed.  
 Coff (2003a) maintains that the existing knowledge-based literature gives insufficient 
consideration to the threat of opportunism.  Much of the existing knowledge literature focuses on 
the difficulties with coordinating and transferring knowledge, and in fact the threat of 
opportunism is often held constant (at zero).  Coff (2003a), on the other hand, sees knowledge-
intensive firms as providing increasing opportunities for opportunistic behavior.   
      Bidding wars during corporate acquisitions of R&D intensive firms provide an 
appropriate context to test Coff’s (1999) hypotheses.  Opportunistic behavior in this context can 
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be viewed as efforts by the target firm’s management to discourage unfriendly bids that may be 
higher (and benefit shareholders) in favor of lower, and friendlier, bids that will offer better job 
security to the existing management. Coff (2003a) suggests that the threat of existing 
management behaving opportunistically and offering a “lockup” agreement that may discourage 
bidders will increase with the knowledge intensity of the firm.  Since the value of a knowledge-
intensive target in an acquisition depends on the acquirer being able to transfer complex and tacit 
knowledge, they will be increasingly dependent upon the cooperation of the target firm for the 
transfer of knowledge.  This need for cooperation is key.  Absent this, the hostile bidder would 
not be discouraged by the target firm’s tactics, and would continue to bid aggressively. The need 
for cooperation also means that a lockup agreement given to a friendly bidder will serve as a 
more powerful, and credible, signal to potential hostile bidders. The potential hostile bidder may 
be discouraged from even making an attempt to acquire the target, since it is clear that 
cooperation would not be forthcoming.   
      Coff (2003a) tests his hypotheses using a sample of attempted acquisitions during 1980-
1999 taken from the SDC mergers and acquisitions database. The following three hypotheses are 
tested:  (1) the likelihood that targets will grant lockup agreements increases with target R&D 
intensity; (2) the likelihood of bidding wars decreases as target R&D intensity increases, and   
(3) management buyouts will be positively associated with bidding wars as target R&D intensity 
increases.  The first two are supported, while the third, which is based on the argument that an 
attempted management buyout will serve as a signal that the firm is undervalued, is not.  An 
important conclusion related to the focus of this dissertation is that the market for corporate 
control may be less efficient for knowledge-intensive firms.  This evidence of market 
30 
 
inefficiency lends additional support to the position held in this dissertation that, on average, 
financial markets respond inefficiently to firm investments in human capital. 
 Bowman and Swart (2007) explain how the firm’s ability to “capture” or appropriate 
value is dependent upon the forms of capital (separable, embodied, and embedded) involved in 
the creation and capture of value.  This study maintains that simply making a distinction between 
physical and human capital is not sufficient to provide insights regarding generation and capture 
of value. Valuable resources are embedded in the interrelationship between the firm and 
individual.  Capital is “embedded” and of greater value to the firm when there is ambiguity 
surrounding the rent creating contributions of human capital.  This embedded capital consists of 
the rent generating synergies between separable and human forms of capital.   
The capture of these rents by either the firm or employees will be a function of the 
perceived dependence, or bargaining power, of the parties involved.  The two key conditions that 
the study sees as giving employees with embodied human capital influence over the capture of 
value are: 1) whether their skills are difficult for the firm to replicate; and 2) whether the skills 
are mobile.  Also, this perceived power relationship may be affected by other components, either 
separable or embodied, in the value creation process that give control over the deployment of the 
valuable embedded capital. The firm may attempt to codify and convert embedded into separable 
capital to improve their bargaining position, while employees may resist this codification and 
attempt to convert embedded into embodied capital.  So, particularly in knowledge-intensive 
industries where employees are less dependent upon firm resources to deploy their embodied 
capital, they may be in a stronger bargaining position.  The study concludes that the bargaining 
strength of employees is primarily a function of the firm’s capital structure (separable, embodied, 
embedded): “the more separable capital in the structure, ceteris paribus, the weaker the 
31 
 
bargaining power of employees, and the more the structure is dominated by embodied capital, 
the stronger the bargaining power of employees” (p.499).   
 This article also builds upon Coff (1999) in at least two ways.  First, it introduces the 
concept of embedded capital to situations of bargaining and rent capture.  Second, it begins to 
introduce a time dimension when it cautions that firms overaggressive in rent capture in one 
period may suffer in future periods as employees either quit or become less productive.    
In a recently-published paper, Coff (2010) continues this investigation of the dynamic 
relationship between rent generation (capability development in this article) and appropriation, 
and highlights a shortcoming in existing approaches to rent appropriation in that they are static 
and only consider bargaining power at a particular point in time.  A more complete theory of rent 
appropriation requires that we consider the coevolution of capabilities and stakeholder 
bargaining power over time. Coff uses Helfat and Peteraf’s (2003) capability life cycle model to 
illustrate how those with knowledge asymmetries who are in a position to develop capabilities 
and create value, may balance current value creation concerns with their anticipated future ability 
to appropriate rents that may be generated.  Organizational form and resource investment 
decisions are made with concern for how they will affect the future ability to appropriate rent.  
This can result in decisions that do not always maximize the value creation potential of a 
capability.  While Bowman and Swart (2007) contribute to our understanding of the dynamic 
relationship between value generation and appropriation by noting possible effects of 
overzealous appropriation on future turnover and motivation, Coff (2010) explains how this 
dynamic relationship may actually affect the allocation of resources and development of 
capabilities over time.  The changing knowledge asymmetries, composition of stakeholders, and 
opportunities for ex ante bargaining “influence both the magnitude of rent that would be 
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observable in measures of firm performance and the timing of when such effects might be 
apparent” (p.726). 
Human capital may be a source of potential competitive advantage, but actually realizing 
this advantage is no simple task.  Management of employees with higher levels of human capital 
is a complex task, and appropriating any returns that may arise from investing in human capital 
is also difficult.  This difficulty in appropriation depends on several factors affecting the 
bargaining power between employee and the firm. 
 
Summary and Conclusion of the Literature Review 
The existing research literature shows that there are both direct and indirect relationship 
between human resources strategies and firm performance.  Most findings are of a contingent 
nature, and for the most part show human capital as either moderating, or being moderated by, 
firm strategy.  Aside from the Lynch and Black’s (1998) study there has been little explicit 
consideration of the relationship between physical capital and human capital, except for the use 
of physical capital intensity as a control variable. From the Technology literature, we see that 
technology may serve as either a complement or substitute for skilled labor, depending upon how 
the technology is used. Also, from this literature we see that technology investments can 
influence skill requirements either directly, or through the organizational changes that often 
accompany technology investments. This research literature begins to ask interesting questions, 
but unfortunately does not consider the specificity of either the physical capital (technology) or 
human capital.  
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CHAPTER 3:  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Human Capital Theory 
 
Human capital theory (Becker, 1962a, 1964) states that investments in the training and 
education of employees have economic value because they benefit the knowledge and skills of 
these employees, thereby improving their productivity.10  At its most basic, the relationship 
between an employee’s human capital and their wages and productivity is said to be as follows:  
an investment by either the firm or employee in training or education increases the employee’s 
human capital; this increase in human capital, whether general or firm-specific, is expected to 
have a positive influence on the employee’s productivity; and this increase in productivity is then 
expected to have a positive impact on employee wages.  The specificity of human capital will 
determine whether the increase in an employee’s wages fully reflects their increase in 
productivity, and it will also influence who pays – the firm or employee – for the training or 
education that generates this increase in human capital.   
If the training or education generates human capital that is of a general nature, meaning 
that it is equally valued by firms in the external labor market, then, assuming an efficient labor 
market, the employer will need to pay the employee their marginal product and will not profit 
from any increase in this employee’s productivity.  The employer, realizing that they will be 
unable to appropriate returns from investments they make in the general human capital of an 
employee, will be reluctant to provide such training or education, unless it is at the employee’s 
expense.  So, the employee is expected to pay for, and retain the returns to, investments in 
general human capital.   
                                                            
10 As noted in previous chapter, Becker’s (1962a, 1964) original, broader, definition of human capital also 
considered investments in medical care, migration, and information and the influence of these 
investments on monetary and psychic income. 
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If, on the other hand, investments in training or education result in human capital that is 
firm specific in nature, then the employee’s productivity in their current position would increase, 
but they would not have increased value in the external labor market.  The employer will value 
this firm-specific human capital because it is tailored to the physical capital and production 
processes of their specific firm and therefore assumed to be more productive than equivalent 
levels of general human capital operating standardized machinery (Becker, 1993).  The 
willingness of the firm to pay for the training that develops this firm-specific human capital will 
depend in part on factors including turnover rates, wage rates, and layoff rates (Becker, 1962a: 
20).  It is assumed that whatever portion of the investment in training each party makes, they will 
receive the same proportion of any returns to the investment (Becker, 1993: 45; Hashimoto, 
1981).  Employees are likely to earn a wage higher than what would be possible in the external 
labor market, but lower than the full value of their marginal product.  To the extent that this wage 
is higher than the employee’s next best option at another firm, they are said to be “appropriating” 
quasi rents from their current employer.  But, the employee is only receiving some portion of 
these quasi rents – the firm keeps the remainder.  The employer is therefore more willing to 
make (pay for) an investment in the employee’s firm specific human capital, as opposed to 
general human capital, since the employer may also have an opportunity to benefit from the 
investment.   
From the perspective of human capital theory, firms make these investments in 
employees because they expect an improvement in the productivity and/or efficiency of the 
employees, because they hope to retain a portion of any returns generated by this investment, and 
because this investment in human capital is considered a capital investment that will continue to 
generate returns in future time periods.  The theory provides a rationale explaining when firms 
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will be willing to invest in their employees’ human capital, but the equilibrium perspective of 
Becker’s (1964) human capital theory does not provide any insights with regards to whether 
these investments will generate economic profits for the firm. Becker states that:  “Firms would 
collect the return from such (specific) training in the form of larger profits resulting from higher 
productivity, and training would be provided whenever the return – discounted at an appropriate 
rate – was as least as large as the cost.  Long-run competitive equilibrium requires that the 
present value of the return exactly equals the cost” (1993: 42, emphasis added).  Firms may be 
better off making these investments than not making them, but the equilibrium assumption 
doesn’t allow for any sustained economic profits.  Under this equilibrium assumption, the firm’s 
investments in human capital would only be helping the firm to maintain competitive parity.   
 
Resource-based Theory 
 
The resource-based view of the firm is a common, perhaps dominant, framework within 
both Strategic Management and Strategic HR for examining persistent performance differentials 
between competing firms.  As such, it is not constrained by the same equilibrium assumptions as 
human capital theory.  In fact, its two primary assumptions about resources are that: 1) resources 
are heterogeneously distributed among firms, and 2) resources are less than perfectly mobile.  
From a resource-based approach, firms are willing to make investments in human capital, 
particularly firm-specific human capital, because the tacit, complex, and even causally 
ambiguous nature of this intangible asset makes imitation by competitors difficult (Reed & 
DeFillippi, 1990; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984). Investments in the knowledge and 
skills of employees are thought to be increasingly important in this knowledge-based economy.  
At a minimum, these investments are thought to be necessary to maintain competitive parity, and 
if the human capital is firm specific, its idiosyncratic and likely tacit nature has the potential to 
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be a more enduring source of competitive advantage than more tangible investments.  The tacit 
knowledge, likely developed through experience or on-the-job training, may involve knowledge 
of individual skills, team operation, or other organizational know how. This tacitness is attractive 
to the firm as it makes imitability by competitors difficult.  Also, firm specific human capital, 
which may or may not include tacit knowledge, will also be attractive to the firm from a 
resource-based perspective.  Employees with this human capital may have been specially trained 
for difficult and unusual tasks, and will therefore be more productive following training, or they 
may have developed this firm-specific human capital over time as they became more efficient 
after learning to work in a team environment or after learning the unique structures and processes 
within their organization.  
Makadok (2003) notes that there are two “distinct but related research streams” within 
the RBV and related areas, which are labeled “competence-based perspectives” (p.1045).  In the 
first stream the focus is on ways in which the firm can maintain or extend existing sources of 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  Here, Barney’s (1991) familiar 
VRIN11 framework states that firm resources characterized by value, rarity, inimitability, and 
non-substitutability will be sources of sustainable competitive advantage.  From this view, firms 
should look to their current stock of human capital to see if it can be deployed in strategies that 
will result in advantages with VRIN characteristics, Firms may search current employees for 
those with valuable and previously untapped abilities that could be employed in strategies 
difficult for competitors to imitate.  Or firms may search for ways to combine existing employees 
                                                            
11 Later amended to VRIO (first described in Barney 1995; see Barney 1997, ch.5 for more detailed 
explanation).  Non-substitutability remains relevant, but moves under the heading of Inimitability (1997: 
151).  VRIN becomes VRI, and the “O” for organization is added to emphasize that in order for potential 
competitive advantage to be realized when resources have these desirable characteristics, the firm must 
also be organized in a way that fully exploits the resources.  Examples of relevant Organizational 
attributes include the firm’s formal reporting structure and its compensation policies. 
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in new ways, and in combination with other firm assets, that will result in superior performance 
that is difficult for competitors to analyze or imitate.  From the contribution made by Dierickx 
and Cool (1989) to this perspective, we know that factor markets for certain resources, including 
firm-specific human capital resources, are incomplete and potential sources of advantage.  Firms 
may examine current human capital asset stocks to see where they might build on existing 
strengths, generating stocks of these assets that could be deployed to profitable strategies that are 
difficult for competitors to imitate, due to factors including the asset mass efficiencies that will 
develop and the time compression diseconomies competitors will suffer as they attempt to rush 
imitation.  
 In the second resource-, or competence-, related stream described by Makadok (2003) the 
focus is on the generation of new competitive advantage and rents (Barney, 1986; Makadok, 
2001).  From this view, investing in human capital is attractive for firms if there is some factor 
market friction that allows them to either invest in and develop human capital internally, or 
“pick” employees in the external labor market, at a cost less than the full value.  Market frictions 
present during the firm’s investments in training and internally developing firm-specific human 
capital make this attractive from a resource-based perspective.  From Barney’s (1986) 
perspective, new competitive advantages generated from resources purchased in strategic factor 
markets will generally only arise if the firm has some superior ability in judging the future value 
of resources due to asymmetric information, or if the firm is lucky.  Makadok (2003) relaxes 
Barney’s (1986) strict profit maximization assumption and then models the interaction of firms 
both becoming more competent in predicting the future value of resources and reducing the 
agency problem of manager shirking.  Makadok (2003) states that managers will under invest in 
resources of uncertain value, and that there is complementarity with regards to lessening this 
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underinvestment when firms can both improve accuracy of expectations (perhaps, Makadok 
(2003) notes, through investing in organizational mechanisms for gathering and interpreting 
information) and lessen agency problems. 
 
Underinvestment in Human Capital due to Information Limitations  
Human capital theory offers reasons for expecting human capital investments to be 
productive, and the resource-based theory explains why investments may be methods of both 
generating new competitive advantages and maintaining existing ones.  There are Information-
based reasons for expecting firms to underinvest in human capital.  And, if underinvestment 
exists, then, as with any other asset in which there is underinvestment, the firm has not invested 
in this asset to the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.  Therefore, the firm would 
realize positive abnormal returns on additional investments in this asset.  
A first reason to expect underinvestment is that the exact increases in human capital 
resulting from training, experience, or formal education may be difficult to measure with 
accuracy, making optimization by management difficult.  We can measure the dollars spent on 
training or education or perhaps an increase in productivity, but do these measures fully capture 
the increased knowledge, know-how and skills of the employee following training?  We rely on 
proxies such as wage increases, tenure, or time and money spent on training and education, since 
the actual return is often immeasurable.  In addition to a lack of devices or even physical ability 
to measure this investment, it’s also difficult to know with precision how long an employee will 
remain with the firm, or what the rate of depreciation is for this (human) capital investment.   
Such uncertainty is likely to yield underinvestment.  Because of these difficulties in 
measuring the asset (increased value of human capital), and the uncertainty surrounding its 
productive life with the firm, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) require firms 
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to treat these expenditures as “expenses,” despite their investment characteristics. These 
expenditures are fully “expensed” in the year they occur, lowering the firm’s reported earnings.12  
The simple act of classifying these expenditures as “expenses” affects the perceptions and 
investment decisions of managers.  As they begin to think of these expenditures as expenses, 
then, assuming they also believe the value of these human capital expenditures to be independent 
of other firm resources (it’s not), managers are likely to begin treating this expense as they would 
any other, minimizing it for a given level of output.  
In addition to the direct effect that the GAAP expensing requirement may have on a 
manager’s mindset, it will also lower reported earnings in the current period.  As investors have 
received depressed and inaccurate earnings information that they are unable to clarify, at least in 
the near term, they will be dissatisfied and will pressure management to improve performance.  
This pressure, along with management’s inability to provide investors with complete information 
(since they themselves have imperfect measures for the results of their investments in human 
capital) may lead managers to become myopic in their investment behavior.  This nearsighted 
investment behavior will lead managers to minimize current expenses (like training), even if it 
means sacrificing future assets and income. 
Also, the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are generally silent with respect to 
reporting requirements for both a firm’s annual investments in human capital, and its 
accumulated stock of human capital.  Firms are not required to separately disclose these 
investments (classified as “expenses”), and most do not.  They expense training and education 
expenditures (as instructed by GAAP), but in external financial documents these annual 
                                                            
12 A few research studies have noted the possibility that the larger first year tax deduction might be 
attractive to some firms, or that this large expense is rather discretionary in nature (the expenditure can be 
postponed or accelerated), allowing managers to smooth earnings (Hirschey & Weygandt, 1985: 328; 
Coff & Flamholtz, 1993-1994: 38). 
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expenditures are likely to remain aggregated (and unobservable to outsiders) under more general 
cost or expense headings.  
These GAAP forces leading to expensing and aggregating of human capital expenditures 
also work to depress the firm’s market valuation and increase its subsequent cost of capital.  
Initially, when lower than expected earnings are announced following the “expensing” of 
training or other human capital expenditures, managers may be pressured and there could be 
some negative impact on stock price.  When the effects of this expensing begin showing on 
annual reports, total assets will be distorted and low, causing analysts to revise the company 
valuation downward.  With this lower valuation and stock price, the firm’s cost of capital will 
increase, further exacerbating the situation by making it increasingly difficult to make the 
appropriate investments in human capital.  
 
Underinvestment due to Rational Explanations  
 The above explanations for underinvestment suggest that, at times, managers may be 
making investment decisions that are short-sighted or not rational.  This wouldn’t necessarily be 
the case when managers and investors have equally incomplete information regarding the extent 
and benefits resulting from training activities.  But, in cases with asymmetric levels of 
information and underinvestment, managers are either myopic in their behavior, or agency 
considerations exist and managers are putting their own welfare (and job security) ahead of the 
firm’s long-term financial success.   
 Additional, rational, explanations exist that would also explain this underinvestment.  For 
instance, time inconsistency problems may exist.  Managers may face a dilemma when, in the 
present period it may be profit-maximizing to assure current or potential employees of continued 
training and development in future periods.  Employees then make commitments to the firm.  In 
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future periods, the rational (though perhaps not ethical) decision may be to renege on those past 
assurances of continued training and development opportunities.   
 Finally, reluctance among employees may yield underinvestment.  Although managers 
are aware of the future benefits of training activities, they may be unable to convince employees 
to participate in training that develops human capital specific to that particular firm.  As Heli 
Wang and co-authors (Wang, 2002;  Wang & Barney, 2006;  Wang, He & Mahoney 2009) have 
quite insightfully observed, employees may be reluctant to develop firm-specific human capital, 
as this puts the employee in a vulnerable position ex post, particularly in an undiversified firm.  
The value of their human capital is closely tied to machinery and products that may change in 
value and employees are unable to diversify their firm-specific human capital across multiple 
firms. Wang (2002) finds that employees will be less reluctant to make these specific 
commitments in firms that have an appropriate level of corporate diversification.   
 The challenges for managers in these situations include (1) finding ways in the current 
period to make credible commitments to current or potential employees of continued future 
training opportunities, and (2) balancing the potential costs of diversification, and also economic 
and relational incentives to employees that encourage them to make specific commitments, 
against the future benefits the firm can expect from the increases in human capital resulting from 
training.   
 
Specificity-appropriation 
I’ve presented human capital theory to explain why training and other human capital 
investments might be considered productive and whether the firm or employee would be likely to 
pay for and receive the benefits from this investment.  This productivity described in human 
capital theory did not consider costs, competition, or allow in equilibrium for the possibility of 
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economic profits by the firm.  I then introduced resource-based explanations for why investments 
in human capital may be methods of both generating new competitive advantages and 
maintaining existing ones.  To the extent that competitive advantages will eventually result in 
economic profits, the resource-based view has traditionally assumed that rents generated are 
retained by the firm.  When the resource-based view discusses whether a competitive advantage 
is “sustainable” or whether a generated rent is “appropriated” it is generally referring to whether 
the firm is successful in these efforts relative to its customers or competitors.  I include analysis 
of the Information-based issues (asymmetric and/or incomplete), as the context of my 
dissertation involves capital market valuations of an intangible asset – the information-related 
issues are ever present and support my first hypothesis below.  Last, as the resource-based view 
traditionally assumes rents stay within the firm, and will therefore be visible in financial 
measures of performance, I include discussion below explaining whether these overall rents the 
firm initially generates, sometimes referred to as “organizational rents” or “nexus rents” (Coff, 
1999), are more likely to be retained by the firm, as opposed to employees, in this situation. 
To the extent that firms with high investments in human capital also have human capital 
that is more firm specific in nature, I would expect these firms to also be more successful in 
appropriating a portion of the quasi rents from these investments.  This human capital may be 
more specific because it is generated through on-the-job training, or because firms of this type 
are more likely to support high performance, or high-commitment, work practices and other 
policies to increase retention and reduce turnover of valuable employees.  These knowledge-
intensive firms compete in unique ways when providing value to customers.  Tacit and other 
firm-specific knowledge become increasingly important sources of competitive advantage as 
firms move away from direct price competition.  It will be in the firm’s best interest to train, and 
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to retain, these employees.  As firm-specific human capital is developed, in part, through on-the-
job experience, I would expect then that firms with high overall levels of human capital would 
also have human capital that was, on average, more specific in nature.  While there is merit in the 
Appropriability literature including Coff (1999) and others that, when human capital is more 
firm-specific, the employee may, depending upon bargaining power, be able to appropriate some 
portion of the quasi rents, this statement can be deceptive.  The employee’s ability to appropriate 
as specificity increases may, again depending upon bargaining power, increase on a percentage 
basis, but the total dollars of quasi rent available for division between firm and employee will be 
greater when human capital is firm specific.  Human capital theory explains that for perfectly 
general human capital employees are expected to receive their full marginal product and the firm 
only normal market returns (no quasi rents).  This theory also explains that for firm-specific 
human capital there is likely to be some division of the quasi rent between the firm and 
employee.  If the endpoints are marked at one end by a no quasi rent situation, and at the other 
end by a situation where there is some indeterminate division of a positive level of quasi rents, it 
is likely that the appropriation of quasi rents increases for each party as specificity increases 
(depending upon bargaining power).   
I maintain that human capital investments are typically productive, a potential source of 
competitive advantage and rents, and an asset in which firms on average underinvest, due to 
issues related to information reporting, time inconsistency, and employees being rationally 
reluctant to make firm-specific commitments.  As this underinvestment implies that at least some 
employees have not invested to the point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit, firms will 
earn abnormal returns by increasing human capital investments (and decreasing the under-
investment problem).  These firms with high levels of human capital investment and high returns 
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(“organizational rents” or “nexus rents”) will also be able to appropriate a higher percentage of 
the rents subject to possible appropriation by internal stakeholders (employees). I thus expect:  
 
Hypothesis 1:  A signal of firms’ above industry average investments in human capital leads  
   to a positive stock price reaction, ceteris paribus. 
 
Complementarity Section (leading to a general proposition regarding complementarity) 
Economists often measure complementarity using cross (price) elasticity of demand 
(Mansfield, 1979: 119).13  Two items are said to be complements if a decrease in the price of one 
results in an increase in the quantity demanded of the other (holding income and other prices 
constant).  This definition can be expanded to include more than two items.  This demand-based 
definition of complementarity is useful for explaining market structure, and related definitions 
may be useful for examining consumer behavior, but it is less helpful when trying to understand 
firm investment decisions and strategies. 
Moving a step closer to understanding firm investments and strategies, the concept of 
economies of scope was developed (Panzar & Willig, 1977; see also Teece, 1980) in an attempt 
to explain the extent of a firm’s diversification.  A cost function is used to determine whether 
technological or indivisibility-based operating synergies exist between two or more activities that 
would supposedly14 provide a rationale for integrating these multiple activities within the firm 
(diversifying) as opposed to obtaining the necessary services through market transactions.  
Economies of scope exist when the cost of jointly producing two (or more) goods within a single 
firm is less than if they were produced separately in different firms.  These cost functions capture 
                                                            
13 See also Samuelson (1974) for historical review of complementarity definitions in economics. 
 
14 Economies of scope, alone, only provide a rationale for the co-location of activities (Teece, 1980; 
Williamson, 1975).  When significant transaction costs are also present, then a rationale exists for the 
internalization of these co-located activities within a single firm (diversification).  
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a type of synergy resulting from co-location or integration of activities that allows the firm to 
minimize its costs for a given level of output.  This synergy described by economies of scope is 
similar, but not equivalent, to the definition of complementarity commonly subscribed to in 
management research. 
 Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1992) provide the definition of complementarity common in 
current management research. These papers note that the standard definition of complementarity 
in economics is market oriented – two inputs in a production process are said to be complements 
if a decrease in the price of one causes an increase in the demand for the other.  In order to be 
able to employ the concept of complementarity usefully to examine the choices of levels of 
various internal activities as well as levels of input purchases, Milgrom and Roberts introduce 
“an alternative, more inclusive, definition:  Several activities are mutually complementary if 
doing more of any one activity increases (or at least does not decrease) the marginal profitability 
of each other activity in the group.” (1992: 108). This definition has similarities to the 
technological complementarities described by both Panzar and Willig (1977) and Teece (1980).  
Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990, 1992) view of complementarity differs from the technological 
complementarity described in this economy of scope literature, though, in that with 
complementarities described in reference to economies of scope output is fixed and the objective 
is a minimization of costs.  Economies of scope complementarities due to indivisibilities are 
more distant than technological complementarities are from Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990, 1992) 
definition. With indivisibilities, benefits to co-location or internalization arise due to a lumpiness 
and inability to market the excess capacity of a resource or activity, not from any synergy 
between activities or resources resulting in either sub-additivity (economies of scope), or super-
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modularity (Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990, 1992) definition).  Also, with indivisibilities, the 
benefits do not necessarily go in both directions. 
 Early research applying this newer version of complementarity to issues of interest in 
management would include Milgrom and Roberts’ (1990, 1995) own work, which examines 
complementarities between inputs and activities (including marketing, production, engineering, 
and organizational) relating to firm strategy in a modern manufacturing environment.  Milgrom 
and Roberts (1990, 1995) find that pairwise complementarities exist, but that the greatest benefit 
comes from having the appropriate bundle or cluster of these important activities. 
 Resource-based research examines the role of complementarities in both generating and 
appropriating rents.  According to Mahoney and Pandian, “the existence and maintenance of 
rents depend upon a lack of competition in either acquiring or developing complementary 
resources” (1992: 364).  Lippman and Rumelt have a generally consistent view, stating “absent 
complementarities, the only gains to trade in the asset market arise from asymmetric 
information” (2003: 1080).  Complementarities are necessary as a firm attempts to generate rents 
in the factor market through superior “resource picking” (Makadok, 2001) as this superior 
picking will be the result of capability development in evaluating market opportunities (Barney, 
1986).  These capabilities will involve bundles of internally-developed, idiosyncratic activities 
that are complementary in nature.  An idiosyncratic relationship between a firm’s existing 
complementary resources “idiosyncratic bilateral synergy” (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992) will be 
present in internally-developed capabilities that generate rents, and these idiosyncratic 
complementarities will also allow rents when acquiring resources in the external market, as these 
external resources will have different values to each bidding firm. 
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The economic language of complementarity evokes the older concept of fit in strategic 
management. Fit is a central concept of strategic management (Chandler, 1962; Ghemawat, 
2002; Miles & Snow, 1994; Porter, 1996; Rumelt, 1974). Fit, also known as matching or 
alignment, occurs when the internal organization, or structure, of the firm matches the resources 
and capabilities, or strategy, chosen to compete in the marketplace.  High performing firms have 
developed resources and capabilities consistent with opportunities and constraints imposed by 
the environment, and have developed organizational structures to utilize those resources.  The 
existence of resources is not sufficient to secure competitive advantage; they must be deployed in 
complementary ways with other resources and organizational elements to create capabilities for 
long run competitive advantage (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Grant, 1991).  
Caves summarizes: “Strategy gives rise to organizational choices and to decisions about 
acquiring and divesting assets that are selected for the efficient pursuit of this maximization plan.  
This normative formulation is backstopped by an impressive amount of behavioral evidence 
ranging from the historical studies of Chandler to a variety of statistical studies affirming the 
positive value of choosing a strategy that is correctly matched to the attributes of the firm’s 
market and making organizational choices that best serve the elected strategy” (1984: 128). 
While management research on complementary assets has generally focused on a few, 
key, strategic assets and their effects on R&D (Helfat, 1997) or a firm’s ability to appropriate 
returns from innovative efforts (Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997), and the fit literature has 
emphasized the alignment of all firm activities with strategy, the concepts have much in 
common.  In fact, depending upon the specific perspective of fit being considered (Venkatraman, 
1989), the distinction between complementarity and fit may be seen as a matter of degree, not 
type.  Complementary asset research can accommodate more than two variables, and as the 
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number of variables increases, the line between complementarity and some definitions of fit 
become blurred.  Milgrom and Roberts (1995) demonstrate this alignment between the two 
concepts in their article “Complementarity and Fit,”  and predict increased supermodularity, or 
benefits of complementarity, when the entire “cluster” of activities under consideration moves 
together in a “systematic, coherent fashion in response to environmental changes” (1995: 185). 
Whether justified by complementarity or by fit, I expect that resources deployed to 
complement human capital investments by the firm will explain a significant proportion of the 
variance in returns. 
 
Proposition: Resources deployed to complement human capital investments will increase the  
           returns to human capital investments.   
 
Research & Development 
Research and development expenditures generate earnings in future periods, and are also 
valued in the stock market (Griliches, 1981; Sougiannis, 1994; Hirschey & Weygandt, 1985).  
The innovative output of R&D includes patents, valuable trade secrets, new products, and 
process innovations that help to lower the cost and/or improve the quality of existing products or 
services.  In addition, the know-how of R&D employees and the R&D capabilities the firm may 
develop as a result of these investments are valuable and inimitable resources.  
 High R&D intensity is often taken as an indication of the importance of knowledge and 
technology in a firm or industry (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; Caves, 1996).  In a more 
technological, knowledge-intensive environment, the R&D function may be increasingly relied 
upon for functions including new product development and also process innovations in 
manufacturing.  Training and other HR practices aimed at developing human capital may be a 
significant complement to knowledge gained through R&D, as employees at all levels will need 
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to be capable of interacting with advanced technology and conducting advanced operating 
procedures.  They may further need to interact with customers and suppliers that are more 
sophisticated and demanding than the customers and suppliers found at low technology, low 
R&D firms.   
 Since the training and education of employees throughout the firm will be increasingly 
important in a firm with high R&D intensity, I expect: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the firms’ R&D intensity the greater the positive stock price reaction 
                 to the signal of above-average investments in human capital. 
 
Physical Capital 
High physical capital intensity could indicate that a firm has simply substituted away 
from labor and is now employing more automated equipment and procedures that require fewer 
and less-skilled employees.  But it may also mean that the firm is investing in computers and 
other technology intended to improve the information-processing capabilities and productivity of 
employees, and not replace them.  Furthermore, even in a firm where high physical capital 
intensity indicates a substitution away from labor, the remaining employees, particularly non-
production employees, may require an increase in training and education.  In the 21st century, a 
substitution away from labor often results in a computerized, highly automated environment 
where employees will need to learn new computer programs and may find themselves trouble-
shooting and repairing the automated equipment that now handles much of the production.  If the 
high physical capital intensity indicates that the firm is either attempting to facilitate the 
information-processing capabilities of its employees, or that the firm is now operating a more 
automated but also more high-tech environment, then, as this physical capital intensity increases 
50 
 
and the employees are operating in an environment where their knowledge and skills are 
increasingly relied upon, I would expect: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The higher the firms’ physical capital intensity the greater the positive stock  
   price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital.   
 
 
Interaction of Physical Capital and R&D 
If high physical capital intensity exists in a firm with low R&D intensity, this may 
indicate a firm emphasizing low cost production that is less concerned about either new product 
development, or process innovations to improve quality.  In this environment, a highly-trained 
and knowledgeable employee would not likely be as valued and would not be able to put their 
abilities to as productive use.  If, on the other hand, the firm had a high physical capital intensity 
that indicated an emphasis on information processing capabilities and high-tech production 
technologies, then a highly capable and well-trained R&D department would become 
increasingly important.  Also, employees in other departments throughout the firm would be 
better able to make productive use of any investments that had been made in their training or 
education.  I therefore expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  The higher the interaction of physical capital intensity and R&D intensity the  
  greater the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average   
  investments in human capital. 
 
 
Advertising / Differentiation  
The objectives of marketing-related expenditures are to satisfy the customer’s needs, and 
contribute to the business-level objective of attaining a competitive advantage (Bagozzi, 1986).  
Efforts to improve customer perceptions and satisfaction (adoption of a market “orientation”) 
may be seen as investments in the drivers that increase customer utility, an increase in which 
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increases the probability customers will purchase a firm’s product or service, thereby increasing 
the customer’s value to the firm (Rust, Lemon, & Zeithaml, 2004: 112; Srivastava, Shervani, & 
Fahey, 1998). 
Many of these marketing-related expenditures generate intangible assets of lasting value 
to the firm (Mizik & Jacobson, 2008; Graham & Frankenberger, 2000).  In fact, Srivastava, 
Shervani, and Fahey define marketing as being concerned “with the task of developing and 
managing market-based assets” (1998: 2). Expenditures benefit the firm’s overall reputation, 
brand values, relationships and networks with suppliers and customers, and the know-how and 
capabilities required for analyzing and responding to market information (Doyle, 2000: 320; 
Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998).  These intangible, market-based assets are for the most 
part (mis-)classified as “expenses” on the firm’s income statement, despite their investment 
characteristics and impact on the firm’s market value (Doyle, 2000).   
The firm’s brand asset can further be divided into several components, the most 
prominent of which is its differentiation (Mizik & Jacobson, 2008).  Differentiation is a primary 
motivation behind a firm’s making substantial advertising and marketing-related expenditures.  
In fact, Differentiation and Low Cost form the basis of Porter’s three (1980) or four (1985) 
generic business-level strategies. Mizik and Jacobson (2008) measure the value of differentiation 
and find it to be unaccounted for by financial markets, with abnormal stock returns occurring in 
the period following increased differentiation.     
Market-based assets arising from successful differentiation are valuable to the firm 
because, as the firm is successful either in communicating the objective attributes of its products, 
or in generating a perceived differentiation in the mind of the consumer, it is able to move away 
from direct price competition (Caves & Williamson, 1985).  Also, product differentiation may 
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create a long-run barrier to entry (Carlton & Perloff, 2005: 80).  Successfully differentiating a 
product or developing a brand requires significant sunk cost expenditures over a period of time 
(Ghemawat, 1991; Sutton, 1991).  If consumers face switching costs and if potential entrants 
face higher marketing costs, then this barrier to entry (a first-mover advantage if no other firms 
have entered the market) may persist (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Sutton, 1991; Carlton & 
Perloff, 2005).   
Also, the firm’s reputation and its brands “signal” information to the consumer about 
quality or reliability of products and services.  These signals are valuable when consumers are 
faced with uncertainty and incomplete information concerning a potential purchase.  If a 
particular brand of product is unknown to a consumer, and the consumer is unable to gather 
information about the product or the reputation of the company selling the product, they may 
decide to avoid this uncertain situation by purchasing a well-known brand that has signaled 
consistent information over time. 
Differentiation requires employees skilled and trained in collecting and analyzing market 
information regarding consumer tastes and preferences, trends, or changes in technology.  
Employees throughout the firm will also need training to develop the skills and knowledge 
necessary to design and efficiently manufacture products that will, by definition, have unique 
characteristics and are likely to be more technologically-advanced than the more standardized 
products of competitors following a cost leadership strategy (Porter, 1980: 35).  Employees in a 
firm striving to differentiate will also need training to increase responsiveness to changing tastes, 
and to any service-related issues of customers.  Also, this same attention to speed of response 
and quality of service for suppliers, vendors and other stakeholders will require that employees 
build skills, nurture relationships and develop valuable tacit knowledge and know-how over a 
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period of time. Training will even be necessary to break down “silos” within the firm and 
develop practices and routines of close interaction and communication between departments.  
This training, perhaps including multi-skill training and job rotations, will be necessary to benefit 
the working relationships between a variety of departments and functions within the firm, 
including R&D, Marketing, and Production (Hutt, 1995).  
Efforts to differentiate and develop brands and reputation have the potential to generate 
value for the firm. In addition, as marketing efforts intensify, the training requirements of 
employees in the Marketing department, and throughout the firm, will increase. As a firm 
increases its efforts to pursue a differentiation strategy (Porter, 1985), several differentiation 
“drivers” related to employee knowledge and abilities become more important.  Drivers related 
to product features, quality and performance will be affected by employee responsiveness, their 
technical training, and the specific relationships that have been developed with customers, and 
between functional departments within the firm, over time (1985: 124-127).    
In addition, to the extent that firms adopting a market “orientation” can be more closely 
associated with pursuing a Differentiation strategy than a Low Cost strategy, these firms will 
benefit if they are also investing in training and educating their employees.  A market orientation 
is marked by a prioritization of service and responsiveness to customer wants and needs.  To be 
responsive, Kohli and Jaworski (1990) state that firms will need to generate market intelligence 
related to present and future customer needs, disseminate this intelligence across departments, 
and then have an organization-wide responsiveness to this information.  A market orientation is 
said to “maximize customer satisfaction” (Baker & Sinkula, 1999: 412), and be characterized by 
a culture that most effectively and efficiently create behaviors in providing superior value for 
buyers (Slater & Narver, 1995).  These characteristics would seem to be more consistent with a 
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Differentiation strategy than a Low Cost strategy. Baker and Sinkula (1999) also found a positive 
empirical relationship between a market orientation and a “learning orientation.”  While a 
learning orientation does not necessarily indicate high levels of human capital investments, the 
multiple processes involved in organizational learning may require training (Slater & Narver, 
1995).  Baker and Sinkula also discuss the need for an entrepreneurial culture within the firm and 
a facilitative leadership that “encourages individual learning” (1999: 69).  Again, it appears that 
as a market orientation is associated with a Differentiation strategy, it will be complemented by 
an environment that promotes learning and investments in human capital. 
Marketing-related expenditures made to differentiate a firm and its brands from 
competitors and develop market-based intangible assets have the potential to benefit the firm in 
the ways described.  Further, these efforts of the firm to distance itself from competitors based on 
the development of distinctive (whether real or perceived) and technologically-advanced 
products and services will be complemented by skilled and knowledgeable employees.  And, 
since the increased effort towards customer responsiveness will place greater demands on the 
information-processing, communication, and relationship-development capacities of employees, 
this will also be complemented by investments in training and education.   
I therefore expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The higher the firms’ advertising intensity the greater the positive stock price     
  reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital.  
 
Interaction of Advertising and R&D 
 Firms investing in either R&D or in Advertising may be attempting to differentiate 
themselves along different dimensions.  Firms emphasizing R&D may focus on cutting-edge 
technology and objective product attributes, while those focusing on Advertising and other 
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Marketing activities may emphasize a more customer-oriented strategy and building a brand and 
strengthening the customers’ perception of quality, differentiated products and services.  The 
R&D vs. Marketing route to differentiation is sometimes thought of as an either-or proposition, 
with either engineering or sales running the ship, a silos mentality, and competition for resources 
within the firm (Maltz, Souder & Kumar, 2001).  But this need not be the case.  For firms able to 
overcome these obstacles there is likely to be a complementarity between these two types of 
investments.  Firms investing in R&D and focusing on technological excellence in products and 
services are likely to have a higher success rate in new product introductions if they work closely 
with the marketing department and take into consideration consumer preferences and other 
research developed through complementary marketing activities.  Also, as a firm investing in 
R&D is successful in developing new technologies and products, this success will only be 
complemented by advertising and marketing activities designed to inform consumers and 
persuade them of the value of these new technologies and products. This possible 
complementary relationship between R&D and Marketing activities (as opposed to the silo 
mentality and competition for resources) is more likely in a firm with substantial training 
activities, as these complementarities may be stressed in training sessions and as training such as 
cross-functional training will help break down the silos and lead to increased communication and 
closer working relationships between departments.   
I therefore expect that:  
 
Hypothesis 6:  The higher the interaction of advertising intensity and R&D intensity the greater 
the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in  
human capital.                                           .  
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Existing Human Capital 
Performance variation in response to training investments may also be explained by the 
existing human capital possessed by a firm’s employees. The new training may be 
complementary with both the general and specific components of an employee’s existing human 
capital, in part because the existing human capital provides absorptive capacity that allows the 
employee to more efficiently learn from new training (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Becker, 1993; 
Mowery & Oxley, 1995).  Additional explanations for the positive relationship between training 
and general human capital include that firm investments in general human capital serve to safe-
guard previous investments in firm-specific human capital (Hansson, 2002), and that the firm 
makes general human capital investments in an effort to increase employee psychic commitment 
(Galunic & Anderson, 2000).  In each of these last two explanations, the intent is to reduce the 
turnover of skilled employees in which the firm has made previous investments.   
I therefore expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 7:  The higher the firms’ per employee wages the greater the positive stock price  
  reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital. 
 
I summarize my hypotheses with the following figure and table. 
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Figure 1:  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 is not included in Figure 1, since the dependent variable in H1 is not exactly the 
same as in the other hypotheses.  In H1, a firm’s returns are compared to its own expected 
returns.  In H2-7, the returns of different firms are compared. 
 
H7 (+)  
H6 (+) 
H4 (+) 
Abnormal 
Returns  
associated 
with  
training 
award
Physical 
capital 
intensity 
H3 (+)
R&D 
intensity 
H2 (+) 
Advertising 
intensity 
Existing Human 
Capital level at 
time of award  
H5 (+) 
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Table 1:  Summary of hypotheses 
 
H1 A signal of firms’ above industry average investments in human capital leads to a positive stock price reaction ceteris paribus. 
H2 The higher the firms’ R&D intensity the greater the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital. 
H3 The higher the firms’ physical capital intensity the greater the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital. 
H4 The higher the interaction of physical capital intensity and R&D intensity the greater the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital. 
H5 The higher the firms’ advertising intensity the greater the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital.  
H6 The higher the interaction of advertising intensity and R&D intensity the greater the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital. 
H7 The higher the firms’ per employee wages the greater the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital.  
 
These hypotheses will be tested after the data are described in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Design 
 
To test my hypotheses, I begin by conducting an event study.  The results of this study 
provide a test of hypothesis 1, and I use the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns from the 
event study as a dependent variable when testing hypotheses 2 – 7.  The events I examine are 
announcements of firms being awarded and ranked as one of Training magazine’s “Training Top 
125” – an annual award recognizing firms for their excellence in training and developing 
employees and human capital management.  As discussed in chapter 3, training and education 
are the two primary methods by which firms invest in and develop human capital in their 
employees.  Conceptually, the use of this training award list provides an indication of firms 
recognized through a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative methodology for their efforts to 
develop human capital.   
 Firms wishing to be considered for this award pay a nominal application fee of less than 
$200 and then complete a comprehensive survey containing more than 40 questions.  The 
evaluation of completed questionnaires is 75% quantitative, with firms being analyzed along the 
following dimensions: (1) Training Program / Scope (including hours of training, number of 
trainers, training budget, best practices, and outstanding initiative) (25% of quantitative score); 
(2) Tuition Reimbursement (10% of quantitative score); (3) Training Infrastructure and Delivery 
(20% of quantitative score); (4) Evaluation / Metrics (25% of quantitative score); and (5) Human 
Resources (including competency maps, compensation tied to training, employee satisfaction 
surveys, length of service and turnover, job openings filled by internal candidates, and 
percentage of new hires referred by employees) (20% of quantitative score).  These results are 
tabulated for Training magazine by an independent outside organization.   
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The remaining 25% of the evaluation is qualitative and is determined by the editors of 
Training magazine (based on survey answers and follow-up interviews).  Factors they consider 
include the results and progress of training programs, innovation, success factors, whether 
training is strategically linked to business goals, corporate commitment to training, potential of 
best practices to be applicable companywide and to other organizations and industries, and the 
ingenuity of outstanding initiatives and their potential to become best practices. 
The “Training Top 125” list has been published annually by Training magazine since 
2001.15  The continuation and expansion of this award since that time is a testament to the 
growing interest among firms in being considered for the award, and to interest among 
subscribers16 of Training magazine in reading about the particular investments and practices of 
winning firms.   
The print edition of Training magazine is published 6 to 7 times annually, with the 
“Training Top 125” edition being released in February of March each year.  The award is 
formally given to each of the winning firms at a gala award ceremony during the training 
industry’s annual “Training Conference & Expo” 3-day conference.  Release of information to 
the public occurs in the following steps: (1) a few weeks prior to the award ceremony, Training 
magazine contacts winning firms to request they attend the ceremony.  At this point, firms know 
they are on the list but do not know their ranking; (2) on the night of the gala award ceremony, 
firms and the award audience learn the rankings, and each firm receives a newly-printed copy of 
the “Training Top 125” issue of Training magazine; (3) approximately 3 days following the 
award ceremony, all 40-45,000 print subscribers are mailed a copy of the publication; (4) a day 
                                                            
15 In its inaugural year of 2001, the award recognized and ranked the top 50 firms.  From 2002 – 2006, the 
top 100 firms were recognized.  And, since 2007 Training magazine has awarded and ranked 125 firms. 
 
16 40-45,000 print subscribers, and an additional 70,000 who receive information through email. 
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or two following this mailing, an additional 70,000 emails are sent out containing award 
information.17 
With an assumption of a (semi-strong) efficient financial market (Fama, 1970), a “signal” 
should only cause an abnormal return to occur if it provides new and unanticipated information.  
The training award signal I use in this dissertation has informational value that can lead to 
abnormal returns for multiple reasons. There is a lack of information in financial markets 
regarding training and education expenditures that exists in part due to the accounting 
profession’s requirement of “expensing” as opposed to capitalizing these expenditures.  To the 
extent that managers are aware of their training efforts, they may be loath to report these 
“expenses” and depress current earnings.  There are no public announcements or explicit 
accounting line items that easily record human capital.  Also, difficulties in measuring the 
underlying changes in human capital often mean that the financial markets will not be able to 
identify new information quickly or easily.  Last, this signal also has relative value.  Because of 
the extensive nature of Training magazine’s questionnaire, we can consider their 1-125 rankings 
as an ordinal ranking.  All else equal, these lists do allow us to say that higher firms on the list 
are being recognized for even greater training efforts and human capital management policies 
than lower firms on a list. Perhaps more importantly, we can assume that these recognized 
companies are likely to have better human capital than those not on the list.  Hence a hard-to-
measure construct of the firm, human capital, is (imperfectly) measured in absolute and 
competitive terms through stock market abnormal returns on or around the announcement of the 
award. 
                                                            
17 Much of this information is based on a February 9, 2010 phone interview with the Editor-in-Chief of 
Training magazine. 
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Daily stock market information is collected from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. Additional variables are collected or constructed 
from COMPUSTAT, Mergent Online, company websites and additional online sources. 
Results at multiple event windows are provided (see Tables 2 and 3).  Those results at 20- 
and 15-day event windows are used when considering the statistical significance of hypothesis 1. 
The estimation window will be a 200 trading day window preceding the event window.   
The specific event day each year will be the first trading day following the announcement 
of awards at Training magazine’s annual gala award ceremony.  These gala ceremonies are held 
in the evening after the U.S. financial markets have completed trading for the day. 
 
Sample 
I limit my observations to firms receiving “Training Top 125” awards during the 2005-
2008 time period.  By 2005, the award was in its fifth year of publication and had developed a 
measure of recognition and credibility.  I end with 2008, as there were minor changes to the 
award instituted in 2009 that involved top 10 firms not being eligible for award the following 
year. As such, the 2005-2008 time period is chosen because it provides the broadest, most 
consistent, and most reliable sample for study.  Also, I consider only publicly-traded firms.  My 
final sample consists of 219 events involving 99 business units (parent firm, or a division or 
subsidiary) of 95 parent corporations.  These firms are from a variety of industries in both the 
manufacturing and service sectors. 
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Variables and Measures 
 
Dependent Variable 
My dependent variables (for H1, and H2-H7) are taken from the measures of Abnormal 
Returns generated during event study analysis.   
In line with the two research questions of the paper, DV1 operationalizes the existence of 
market reaction to the signal, while the DV2-7 captures the variance of the market reaction to the 
signal. These financial performance measures represent unusual and unexpected financial 
returns, on a risk-adjusted basis, to the owners of the firm.  This is akin to the economic profit or 
rent terminology commonly used in strategic management.18  
 
Independent Variables 
 
R&D Intensity 
 
I measure R&D intensity as R&D investment divided by sales (RDINT).  The measures 
for R&D expenditures and Sales are obtained from Compustat.  The measure for annual R&D 
expenditures provided by Compustat is labeled “Research and Development Expense” (XRD). 
The Compustat measure for sales I use is labeled “Sales/Turnover (net)” (SALE).  My measure 
of R&D intensity (RDINT) is then XRD / SALE. 
 
Advertising Intensity / Marketing-related  
I measure Advertising Intensity as advertising expenditures divided by sales (ADINT).  
The measures for advertising expenditures and sales are obtained from Compustat. The 
Advertising variable in Compustat is labeled “Advertising Expense” (XAD). The Compustat 
                                                            
18 In theory, assuming certain market inefficiencies, distinctions can be made between the concepts of 
“abnormal returns” and “economic profit.” In practice, these market-based (abnormal returns) and 
accounting-based (economic profits) measures of financial performance are often used interchangeably. 
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measure for sales is labeled “Sales/Turnover (net)” (SALE). My measure of Advertising 
Intensity (ADINT) is then XAD / SALE. 
 
Physical Capital Intensity  
I measure PC intensity as a firm’s property, plant and equipment expenditures divided by 
sales (PCINT).  The measure for a firm’s property, plant, and equipment expenditures is obtained 
from Compustat and is labeled “Property, Plant and Equipment – Total (Net)” (PPENT).  The 
Compustat measure for sales is labeled “Sales/Turnover (net)” (SALE).  My measure of Physical 
capital intensity (PCINT) is then PPENT / SALE.  
 
Existing Human Capital (at time of award) 
I use a voluntarily-reported Compustat measure “Staff Expense – Total” (XLR)19 to 
generate a rough proxy for the firm’s existing level of human capital.  This Compustat item has 
been used as a basis for constructing various labor stock (Rosett, 2001) and human capital 
indicators (Lajili & Zeghal, 2006).  I divide “Staff Expense - Total” (XLR) by a firm’s sales 
(SALE).  For a given industry, this serves as a useful indication of whether a firm is employing 
unskilled labor, or skilled and educated employees.  As this is only an indirect, composite 
measure of the general and firm-specific human capital possessed by a firm’s employees, and 
because it contains little information with regards to the firm’s attitude and its desire to institute 
policies and practices that lead to a committed, high-performing workforce, the existence of this 
Compustat item does not eliminate the signal provided by the Training Top 125 award.  Also, 
this is an annual measure that would not fully reflect increased wages of employees that may 
result following new training programs.  My measure of the intensity of existing human capital 
                                                            
19 Formerly labeled “Labor and Related costs” in Compustat. 
65 
 
employed by a firm at the time of award, which I will label “Labor Intensity” (LRINT), is then 
XLR / SALE.  
 
Control Variables 
All regression estimations (see Models 2-7 in Tables 5, 6) include 4 control variables.  
These controls are designed to capture variance in abnormal returns related to factors other than 
those derived from the theoretical framework and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. These 
controls are for firm size, whether the award was for the entire corporation or a subsidiary/ 
division, whether the firm won an award in the previous year, and Industry.  Larger firms may be 
more closely scrutinized and have greater coverage by analysts and others in the financial 
markets.   It may be more likely, then, that investors will fully appreciate the training information 
contained in the awards of large firms.  Accordingly, I include Size as a control variable and 
measure it as the natural log of a firm’s total assets.  I expect Size to be positively related to 
abnormal returns.   
Although in most cases the training awards are awarded to an entire corporation, in some 
instances it is only a division or subsidiary that has applied for consideration.  In these instances, 
I would expect the effect of training information on stock price to be diluted, as only a portion of 
a parent corporation is providing new training information to financial markets while all other 
divisions of the firm are not.  I include a control variable (CorpLevel) that is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the training award was for an entire corporation and 0 if the award was only for a 
division/subsidiary of a corporation. I expect CorpLevel to be positively associated with 
abnormal returns.   
I also expect that previous awards won by a firm may be associated with abnormal 
returns.  Firms that have previously won training awards have already provided some training 
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information to financial markets.  Subsequent awards are expected to provide less information 
and be less of a surprise to investors.  Accordingly, I include a control variable for whether or not 
a firm has won an award in the previous year (RLastYr).  I measure RLastYr with a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm won an award in the previous year and 0 if it did not.  I expect 
RLastYr to be negatively associated with abnormal returns. 
Last, I include a control variable for a firm’s industry.  Industry may have an association 
with abnormal returns, as firms in different industries may typically have better (or worse) 
procedures for measuring and reporting training activities to financial markets on a regular basis, 
meaning that awards would provide less (or more) new training information.  Also, analysts or 
investors may consider training to be more crucial in some industries than others.  I therefore 
include a control variable for industry (Industry), measured with 2-digit SIC codes.   
 
Methodology for testing Hypothesis 1:  Event Study 
Following Brown and Warner (1985), I perform the following four steps in conducting an 
event study:  I identify the event, model the normal (expected) returns, estimate the abnormal 
returns, and then analyze summary measures of the abnormal returns (see also Hannon & 
Milkovich, 1996: 414).   
1. Identification of event:  the announcement that a firm has received a Training Top 125 
award for its excellence in training and human capital management. 
2. Expected Returns: 
 
E(ܴ௜௧) = α + ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ + ߝ௜௧  
Where E(ܴ௜௧) is the expected return of firm i on date t, α is the intercept, ߚ௜ is the 
beta of firm i, ܴ௠௧ is the market return on date t, and ߝ௜௧ is the error term for firm i on 
event date t.   
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3. Abnormal Returns: 
 
ܣܴ௜௧ = ܴ௜௧ – α – ߚ௜ܴ௠௧    
 Where ܣܴ௜௧ is the abnormal return for firm i on date t, ܴ௜௧ is the actual return for 
firm i on date t, α is the intercept, ߚ௜ is the beta of firm i, and ܴ௠௧ is the market return on 
date t.  
4. Significance of Abnormal Returns 
Calculated using Eventus software.  The null hypothesis is that the event has no impact 
on either the mean or variance of returns. 
After conducting the event study to determine whether or not abnormal returns exist, following 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997), I attempt to explain the variation in these abnormal returns.  To 
do this task, I conduct the following regression analysis. 
 
Methodology for testing Hypotheses 2-7:  Regression Analysis 
 
My current model suggests the following regression  
ARit = ߚ଴ + ߚଵR&Dit + ߚଶPCit + ߚଷR&Dit*PCit + ߚସAIit + ߚହAIit*R&Dit  + ߚ଺ESHCit  
          + ߚ଻Sizeit + ߚ଼CorpLevelit + ߚଽRlastYrit + ߚଵ଴Industry Dummies + ε 
 
Where the abnormal returns (AR) for a given firm in a given year are influenced by that firm’s 
R&D intensity (R&D), its physical capital intensity (PC), the interaction of its R&D and PC, its 
advertising intensity (AI), the interaction of its AI and R&D, its existing stock of human capital 
at the time of award (ESHC), along with controls for: firm size (Size)(measured by log of total 
assets), whether the award was for the entire corporation or a division/subsidiary (CorpLevel), 
whether the firm was ranked and received an award in the previous year (RLastYr), and Industry 
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(controlled for using 2-digit SIC codes).  These coefficients indicate, for a firm receiving the 
award, the effect on Abnormal Returns of increased levels of each variable.   
Due to gaps in the reporting of data uncovered during the collection of independent 
variables, testing hypotheses 2-7 with one comprehensive model was not feasible.  I therefore 
tested each hypothesis in a separate regression (Models 2-7), using a consistent set of control 
variables across all models.  Results will be reported in Tables 5 and 6.  In Appendix Table 7, I 
report the composition of observations in each sample; each is distinctly different.  (The 
Appendix follows all chapters and references in the dissertation.) 
Each of Models 2-7 (which provide tests of H2-H7, respectively) is tested twice, once 
using measures of financial performance (abnormal returns) obtained from event window 2 (20-
day) of the event study (see Table 5), and once using financial performance measures obtained 
from event window 3 (15-day) of the event study (see Table 6).  I provide the results of both tests 
of each Model, as these multiple tests, if consistent with one other, provide a robustness check 
for any supported hypotheses. 
 Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table 4.
69 
 
CHAPTER 5:  RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Chapter Introduction 
 
In this chapter I report the results of the empirical tests described in Chapter 4, and 
discuss the evidence these results provide with regards to the theory and hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 3.  I first report descriptive statistics of both parametric and non-parametric tests 
conducted as part of the initial event study of this dissertation.  After reporting these event study 
results and the evidence they provide with regards to whether an award for excellence in human 
capital management will be associated with subsequent abnormal returns in stock price (RQ1 and 
H1), I then report the results of regression analyses conducted in an attempt to explain the 
variance in these abnormal returns (RQ2 and H2-H7).   
 The overall findings of all empirical tests show first that there is significant and robust 
support for the hypothesis (H1) that firms do benefit financially from their investments in 
training and human capital management. Using multiple parametric and non-parametric tests, 
and considering event windows of lengths ranging from (-20, +1) to (-10, +1), I find consistent 
support for this hypothesis at the 5%, 1%, and .1% levels of statistical significance.  Findings of 
regression analyses testing hypotheses 2-7 provide more limited support for the notion that 
complementarity between a firm’s human capital investments and its other strategic investments 
explains variance in this increased financial performance.  For example, hypotheses regarding 
the main effects of both R&D and Physical Capital were not supported, but the interaction of 
R&D and Physical Capital was statistically significant in its ability to explain the extent to which 
firms benefit financially from their investments in training and human capital management.  
Also, with regards to Advertising, its interaction with R&D expenditures was not significant, but 
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its main effect was positive and provided a statistically significant explanation regarding 
variance in firm performance.    
 
Results – Event Study 
In conducting the event study to test hypothesis 1, I initially examined six different event 
windows of lengths in days ranging from (-30, +2) to (-2, +1).  I examined these multiple 
windows to test H1, and also to more precisely identify patterns I expected to find in the leakage 
of award information in the days preceding the official announcements.  The results (see Tables 
2 and 3) confirmed my expectation that some amount of information regarding which firms will 
be receiving an award begins to leak out (and be traded upon) in approximately the last 10 to 20 
trading days prior to the official announcement of these human capital awards (see the 2nd-4th, 
and particularly the 2nd and 3rd, windows in Tables 2 and 3).  The longer 30-day window 
generally has less-significant results, as a given magnitude of change in stock price is diluted 
over more days, while the shorter 2 and 5 day windows fail to fully capture stock price changes 
that began prior to these windows. As discussed in the previous chapter, the information 
regarding awards is likely to diffuse slowly for a few weeks before the actual event date. 
 I conducted multiple parametric and non-parametric tests in order to measure the 
statistical significance of any abnormal returns that might occur at these various event windows.  
The three parametric tests conducted were the Patell (1976) test, the Portfolio Time Series test 
(Brown & Warner, 1980), and the Standardized Cross-Sectional test (Boehmer, Musumeci & 
Poulsen, 1991).  Differences between these tests and their assumptions include that the Patell test 
(also sometimes referred to as a standardized abnormal return test) assumes cross-sectional 
independence of returns.  The Portfolio Time Series test (also referred to as a “crude dependence 
adjustment” (CDA) test) (Brown & Warner, 1980), while avoiding the issue of possible cross-
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sectional correlation of security returns, has the limitation of not taking account of unequal return 
variances across securities.  The Standardized Cross-Sectional and Patell tests are similar aside 
from their differing cross-sectional variance adjustments.  All three tests are regularly used in 
event studies.  I will specifically discuss in this section only the p-values associated with the 
Patell test, but an examination of Table 2 clearly reveals that the results, particularly at the 20 
and 15-day windows, are robust and consistent across all three parametric tests. 
 At the first event window listed in Table 2 (-30, +2) there is a mean cumulative abnormal 
return of 1.13%, meaning that the average firm in the event study has a total abnormal return 
over the 30 (actually 33)20 days of the event window of 1.13%.  For the Patell test, this results in 
a Z statistic of 0.767 with a p-value of 0.2216.  So, the abnormal returns at this window are 
positive but not statistically significant.  At the second event window listed in Table 2 (-20, +1), 
the mean cumulative abnormal return of firms receiving an award is 2.01%.  Over this 20-day 
window firms will, on average, see a 2.01% increase in their stock price (and so also in their 
market capitalization).  The Patell Z statistic here is 3.411 with a p-value of 0.0003, meaning that 
these abnormal returns of 2.01% provide strong statistical support for H1 at this window.  At the 
third event window listed in Table 2 (-15, +1), there are mean cumulative abnormal returns of 
1.67% (Patell Z statistic = 3.010, p= 0.0013).  As with the results for the previously-discussed 
20-day window, the results for this 15-day event window also provide strong statistical support 
for H1.  At the fourth event window in Table 2 (-10, +1) the mean cumulative abnormal return is 
1.05% (Patell Z statistic = 1.986, p = 0.0235).  The results at this window provide support for H1 
at the 5% level of significance.  At the fifth window listed in Table 2 (-5, +1) the mean 
                                                            
20 For purposes of convenience and clarity I refer to the six event windows as being 30-day, 20-day, 15-
day, 10-day, 5-day, and 2-day in length.  Technically, the 30-day window is actually 33 days (add day of 
event, and the two days after event), and each of the other five windows are two days longer than stated 
(So, the 20-day window is actually 22 days, the 15-day window is actually 17 days, etc). 
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cumulative abnormal returns are 0.30% and the Patell Z statistic is 0.083 with a p-value of 
0.4668.  These positive abnormal returns of 0.30% do not provide statistically significant support 
for H1.  At the sixth and last event window listed in Table 2 (-2, +1) the mean cumulative 
abnormal returns are 0.17% and the Patell Z statistic is 0.216 with a p-value of 0.4146.  At this 
last window, the positive abnormal returns of 0.17% do not provide statistically significant 
support for H1. 
 Results of the non-parametric tests reported in Table 3 display a pattern of support for 
hypothesis 1 similar to that described above for the parametric tests, and indicates a robustness to 
the overall findings related to H1 that firms do benefit financially from their investments in 
training and human capital management.  The non-parametric tests I conduct are a Generalized 
Sign test and a Rank test.  As the results in Table 3 for these two tests are similar at 5 of the 6 
windows (the exception being the 30-day window), I will limit myself here to an examination of 
the results for the Generalized Sign test.  At the 30-day window there are 120 firms with positive 
abnormal returns, and 102 firms with negative abnormal returns.  When, in the Generalized Sign 
test, these figures of 120 and 102 are compared to expectations based upon a 200-day estimation 
window, the result is a Z statistic of 1.694 with a p-value of 0.0452.  This indicates support for 
H1 at this window at the 5% level of statistical significance.  At the 20-day event window, Table 
3 shows that 119 firms have positive abnormal returns and 103 firms have negative abnormal 
returns.  This results in a Z statistic in the Generalized Sign test of 1.559 with a p-value of 
0.0595, an indication of support for H1 at the 10% (nearly 5%) level of statistical significance.  
At the 15-day window there are 121 firms with positive abnormal returns and 101 firms with 
negative abnormal returns, resulting in a Z statistic for the Generalized Sign test of 1.828 with a 
p-value of 0.0338 (p<5%).  At the 10-day window there are 112 firms with positive abnormal 
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returns and 110 firms with negative abnormal returns, resulting in a Z statistic for the 
Generalized Sign test of 0.619 with a p-value of 0.2679.  At this 10-day window, neither non-
parametric test (Generalized Sign, Rank) provides statistically significant support for H1.  At the 
5-day window there are 111 firms with positive abnormal returns and also 111 firms with 
negative abnormal returns, resulting in a Generalized Sign Z statistic of 0.485 with a p-value of 
0.3139.  This does not provide statistically significant support for H1.  Last, at the 2-day window 
there are 114 firms with positive abnormal returns and 108 firms with negative abnormal returns, 
resulting in a Generalized Sign Z statistic of 0.888 with a p-value of 0.1874.  Although the sign 
is as expected, this p-value does not provide support for H1 at a generally-accepted level of 
statistical significance.   
 In summary, at multiple event windows (the 15- and 20-day windows) and using both 
non-parametric and parametric methods, there is strong support for hypothesis 1 that firms 
benefit financially from human capital training. 
 
Results – Regression Analyses 
 
After completing the event study analysis in an effort to determine whether firms benefit, 
financially, from their investments in training and educating employees and developing related 
human capital management practices and policies, I then conduct regression analyses in an effort 
to better understand factors affecting the extent to which firms may benefit from investing in the 
human capital of their employees.  I take the abnormal returns associated with the event of firms 
receiving an award for their “excellence in training and human capital management” and use 
these abnormal returns as dependent variables in subsequent regression analyses.  These 
regression analyses allow me to test several hypotheses (H2-H7) related to the possible 
importance of complementary assets in explaining the variance in firm financial performance 
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associated with above-average investments in human capital (indicated by the human capital 
award).   
 As the event study results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate, measures of financial performance 
were obtained for event windows of lengths ranging from (-30, +2) to (-2, +1).  Although event 
studies in the Finance literature often make use of event windows in the range of 1-3 days, the 
use of event windows ranging from 5 to 60 days are well-supported within Management 
literature event studies (Chauvin & Guthrie, 1994; Hannon & Milkovich, 1996; Brown & 
Warner, 1980).  As I discussed earlier in the Research Design section of Chapter 4, although I do 
have the precise dates that award information is officially released in each year of my study, I 
also have reason to expect some leakage of information in the few weeks preceding each event.  
Therefore, my results in Table 2, particularly for event windows ranging from (-20, +1) to (-10, 
+1), are consistent with my prior expectations regarding the length of time information leaked 
prior to the official announcements.   
I use the abnormal returns obtained from event windows 2 (-20, +1) and 3 (-15, +1) as 
dependent variables in my regression analyses.  For each of the regressions (Models 2-7) listed in 
Tables 5 (window 2 (-20, +1)) and 6 (window 3 (-15, +1)), a positive and significant coefficient 
for the independent variable is taken as an indication of support for the hypothesis in question.  
As each hypothesis (H2-H7) is tested twice, using abnormal returns from both the 20-day and 
15-day event windows (see Tables 5 and 6, respectively), I will discuss the significance of two 
separate coefficients for each hypothesis.   
Due to data limitations, a single comprehensive regression model was not possible.  For 
example, it was often the case in Compustat data that firms reporting R&D expenditures did not 
also report advertising expenditures.  Therefore, each of hypotheses 2-7 is tested separately using 
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abnormal returns from both the 20 and 15-day windows as dependent variables (see Tables 5 and 
6, respectively).  (These were the two windows consistently and positively significant.)  Model 2 
at each window provides a test of hypothesis 2, Model 3 at each window provides a test of 
hypothesis 3, and so forth. 
Overall, these regression analyses provide partial support for the notion that 
complementarity between a firm’s human capital expenditures and its other strategic investments 
(primarily those related to R&D, Advertising, and Physical Capital) explains variance in 
financial returns to human capital investments.  Hypotheses related to the main effects of both 
R&D and Advertising were not supported, but the interaction of R&D and Advertising was 
positive and statistically significant at both the 20 and 15-day windows (see Tables 5 and 6, 
respectively).  With regards to Advertising, its interaction with R&D expenditures was not 
significant, but its main effect was positive and statistically significant at both windows. 
I now begin a more detailed examination of the coefficients in Models 2-7 and their 
implications regarding the support of each hypothesis.  Again, in each model a positive and 
significant coefficient indicates support for the relevant hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 The coefficient for R&D intensity in the version of Model 2 using abnormal returns from 
event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 5) provides a test of hypothesis 2.  This coefficient is           
-0.103 (p-value = 0.678), and therefore does not provide positive and statistically significant 
support for H2.  In the version of Model 2 using abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see 
Table 6), the coefficient for R&D intensity is -0.005, again does not provide positive and 
significant support for H2 (p-value = 0.981). 
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Hypothesis 3 
 
The coefficient for physical capital intensity in the version of Model 3 using abnormal 
returns from event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 5) provides a test of hypothesis 3.  This 
coefficient is 0.0431, in the predicted direction, but not providing support for H3 at a generally-
accepted level of statistical significance (p-value = 0.177).  In the version of Model 3 using 
abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see Table 6), the coefficient for physical capital 
intensity is 0.0003, again positive, but not providing significant support for H3 (p-value = 0.989). 
 
Hypothesis 4 
The coefficient for the interaction of R&D intensity and physical capital intensity in the 
version of Model 4 using abnormal returns from event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 5) provides 
a test of hypothesis 4.  This coefficient is 3.405, in the predicted direction and supporting H4 at 
the 5% level of statistical significance (p-value = 0.038).  In the version of Model 4 using 
abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see Table 6), the coefficient for the interaction of 
R&D intensity and physical capital intensity is 3.221, in the predicted direction and supporting 
H4 at the 1% level of statistical significance (p-value = 0.007).   
A Model 4a is provided in Tables 5 and 6 to identify the main effects of R&D while 
controlling for Physical Capital intensity (and vice versa), allowing an accurate comparison of 
the direct effects of either R&D or Physical Capital intensity in Model 4a with the interaction 
term in Model 4.  Also, Model 4a uses the same sample as Model 4, while Models 2 and 3 do 
not.   
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Hypothesis 5 
The coefficient for advertising intensity in the version of Model 5 using abnormal returns 
from event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 5) provides a test of hypothesis 5.  This coefficient is 
0.917, in the predicted direction and providing support for H5 at the 1% level of statistical 
significance (p-value = 0.004).  In the version of Model 5 using abnormal returns from window 3 
(-15, +1) (see Table 6), the coefficient for advertising intensity is 0.764, again positive, and 
providing support for H5 at the 5% level of statistical significance (p-value = 0.033). 
 
Hypothesis 6 
 
The coefficient for the interaction of advertising intensity and R&D intensity in the 
version of Model 6 using abnormal returns from event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 5) provides 
a test of hypothesis 6.  This coefficient is 13.41, in the predicted direction but not supporting H6 
at a generally accepted level of statistical significance (p-value = 0.210).  In the version of Model 
6 using abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see Table 6), the coefficient for the 
interaction of advertising intensity and R&D intensity is 1.487, again positive, but also not 
providing support for H6 at a generally accepted level of statistical significance (p-value = 
0.898).   
A Model 6a is provided in Tables 5 and 6 to identify the main effects of R&D while 
controlling for Advertising intensity (and vice versa), allowing an accurate comparison of the 
direct effects of either R&D or Advertising intensity in Model 6a with the interaction term in 
Model 6.  Also, Model 6a uses the same sample as Model 6, while Models 2 and 5 do not.   
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Hypothesis 7 
The coefficient for Labor intensity [my measure for the “existing stock of human capital” 
(ESHC) in H7] in the version of Model 7 using abnormal returns from event window 2 (-20, +1) 
(see Table 5) provides a test of hypothesis 7.  This coefficient is -0.561, opposite the predicted 
direction and statistically significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.063).  In the version of Model 
7 using abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see Table 6), the coefficient for Labor 
intensity is -0.351, again opposite the predicted direction, but in this case not statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.132). 
 
Discussion 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 Event study results provide a clear, consistent (at the 20- and 15-day windows) finding to 
the first research question of this dissertation:  do firms benefit, financially, from investments in 
training and human capital management?  The data support an answer of “Yes.”  At multiple 
event windows and using multiple parametric and non-parametric tests, the results corroborate 
this interpretation. Training awards provide signals to financial markets21 of firms’ above 
industry average investments in training and their overall perspective and commitment to 
developing the human capital of their employees. Accepting that financial markets react (semi-
strong) efficiently22 to this new information, the present value of anticipated future benefits to 
the firm resulting from training investments are calculated and imputed at the time of each event 
into each firm’s stock price and market capitalization.  The net change in stock price attributed to 
                                                            
21 These awards also provide information to job markets, to customers, and to various other current and 
potential stakeholders.   
 
22 Perhaps imperfectly, but in an unbiased manner. 
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the award and the new information it provides is “the abnormal return.”  When the abnormal 
return is multiplied by the number of shares outstanding for a given firm, the result is the net 
change in market capitalization and the total present value, according to market analysts, of the 
investments in training and human capital management for which the firm won an award. 
 The regression analyses results provide limited support for the general proposition, tested 
in hypotheses 2-7, that complementarity between a firm’s human capital investments and its 
other strategic assets and investments helps explain variance in returns to training and human 
capital investments.   
 
Hypothesis 2 
 Model 2 in Tables 5 and 6 does not support the hypothesis that the higher the firms’ R&D 
intensity the greater the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average investments 
in human capital (H2).  In fact, the coefficients for R&D intensity in both Tables 5 and 6, 
although not statistically significant, have signs that do not conform to the expected direction of 
effects.  It is possible that the theory here may be more complex than expected, or at least more 
complex than what is specified in Model 2.  Model 2 includes measures for R&D intensity and 
all control variables, but I am not able to include measures for each of the other strategic assets 
of my study.  For example, in Model 2 I implicitly assume that the marginal effect of R&D 
intensity on human capital is the same across different levels of Physical Capital (Physical 
Capital variable not included in Model 2).   
It may also be the case that issues related to the measurement and recording of both R&D 
and training expenditures may be at play.  It may be that, in more knowledge-intensive firms 
where a greater percentage of employees are employed in R&D, training activities within R&D 
departments are more likely to be inaccurately recorded as R&D expenditures.  This may occur 
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out of convenience, or be due to a lack of well-specified policies regarding the recording and 
reporting of training expenditures and other human capital investments.   
 
Hypothesis 3 
 Although Model 3 in Tables 5 and 6 provides little statistical support for the main effect 
of Physical Capital intensity (H3), at least the signs conform to the expected direction of effect 
(positive).  Significant negative coefficients for the main effect of Physical Capital would have 
indicated support for a capital-labor substitution hypothesis.  As much of a firm’s technology is 
embodied in its physical capital, and in fact a substantial portion of annual (physical) capital 
expenditures often consist of computers and related technologies, these coefficients are at least in 
the expected direction and do not contradict my expectation of a positive association between 
increased physical/technological investments and the higher-than-average human capital 
investments of firms in my sample.  Perhaps more fine-grained measures of physical capital 
might uncover subsets of firms for which statistically significant positive relationships do exist. 
Hypothesis 4 
 Model 4 provides statistically significant support for the hypothesis that the higher the 
interaction of Physical Capital intensity and R&D intensity the greater the positive stock price 
reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital.  In the presence of high 
human capital investments (all firms in my sample) there is a positive interaction between 
Physical Capital intensity and R&D intensity.  This supports H4 and my general proposition 
regarding complementarity, and it also provides an interesting contrast to the results, or lack of 
results, in Models 2 and 3.  The main effects of both R&D intensity (Model 2) and Physical 
Capital intensity were each not significant, but in Model 4 their positive interaction supports the 
hypothesis of complementarity between these two variables in this environment of high human 
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capital investments (all firms in sample).  It appears that the marginal effect of R&D intensity 
changes across different levels of Physical Capital intensity, and vice versa.   
 
Hypothesis 5 
 Although Model 2-4 results begin to paint a picture that main effects for independent 
variables (the “strategic assets”, in addition to human capital, considered in my study) will not be 
significant, but their interactions will, in the case of Advertising intensity, the main effect is 
positive and statistically significant in Model 5 (see Tables 5 and 6).  The above-average human 
capital investments of firms in my sample appears to support the financial returns to advertising 
investments, but advertising does not appear to be as closely related to R&D activities as was the 
case described above with regards to the Physical Capital and R&D relationship (see Model 2-4 
discussion above). 
Hypothesis 6 
 As I mentioned in the Model 5/ H5 discussion above, the coefficient for the main effect 
of Advertising intensity was positive and statistically significant. When I examined the 
interaction of Advertising intensity and R&D intensity in Model 6, though, results were not 
significant.  The signs for the interaction term did happen to conform to the expected direction of 
effects in both Tables 5 and 6, but offered little statistical support for the hypothesis that the 
higher the interaction of advertising intensity and R&D intensity the greater the positive stock 
price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in human capital.  These two activities 
within the firm would not appear to be closely dependent upon each other within a firm.  A more 
important factor may be that they are sometimes considered alternative avenues through which a 
firm may build its brands and reputation over time.  Firms may either emphasize a more 
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technological and product-oriented strategy, or differentiate themselves through their advertising 
efforts. 
Hypothesis 7 
 In Model 7, I examine the possible relationship between the existing level of skills and 
abilities (or human capital) of employees at the time of award and the new training initiatives and 
investments that led to the award.  I hypothesized in H7 that the higher the firms’ per employee 
wages the greater the positive stock price reaction to the signal of above-average investments in 
human capital.  My argument in support of this hypothesis being that the pre-existing level of 
skills and abilities at the time of any new training initiatives would provide an absorptive 
capacity that would facilitate more efficient training and greater financial returns.  The 
coefficients for Labor Intensity (my measure of pre-existing level of skills and abilities) in Model 
7 do not support this hypothesis.  In fact, in both Tables 5 and 6 the sign does not conform to the 
expected direction of effects, and in Table 5 this negative relationship is statistically significant 
at the 10% level.  It may be that my attempt to capture the pre-existing level of human capital by 
simply using “Labor Intensity,” a Compustat measure of a firm’s total wages and staff 
expenditures, does not fully or accurately enough capture existing human capital.  
 Among the control variables, most were consistently insignificant.  The only one that was 
significant was the Corporate Level, and its sign oscillated between positive and negative.  A 
relatively small number of observations won the award at a divisional rather than a corporate 
level, and so the occasional significance may reflect small numbers. 
In the final chapter I discuss findings in more detail and draw implications for future 
research. 
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Table 2:  Parametric event study results at various event windows 
 
Event  
Window # 
Event 
Window  
Mean 
CAR  
Patell Z  p-value  Portfolio 
Time Series 
(CDA) 
p-value  StdCsect 
Z 
p-value 
1 (-30, +2)  1.13% 0.767 0.2216 1.483+ 0.0691 0.674 0.2501 
2 (-20, +1)  2.01% 3.411*** 0.0003 3.234*** 0.0006 2.729** 0.0032 
3 (-15, +1)  1.67% 3.010** 0.0013 3.064** 0.0011 2.244* 0.0124 
4 (-10, +1)  1.05% 1.986* 0.0235 2.296** 0.0108 1.537+ 0.0622 
5 (-5, +1)  0.30% 0.083 0.4668 0.856 0.1961 0.080 0.4682 
6 (-2, +1)  0.17% 0.216 0.4146 0.629 0.2648 0.216 0.4144 
Significance levels:  + p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.  
N = 222 
 
 
 
84 
 
Table 3:  Non-parametric event study results at various event windows 
 
Event  
Window # 
Event 
Window  
Positive: 
Negative 
Generalized Sign 
Z 
p-value Rank Test Z p-value 
1 (-30, +2)  120: 102* 1.694* 0.0452 0.060 0.4761 
2 (-20, +1)  119: 103+ 1.559+ 0.0595 2.024* 0.0221 
3 (-15, +1)  121: 101* 1.828* 0.0338 1.821* 0.0350 
4 (-10, +1)  112: 110 0.619 0.2679 0.878 0.1904 
5 (-5, +1)  111: 111 0.485 0.3139 0.397 0.3460 
6 (-2, +1)  114: 108 0.888 0.1874 0.725 0.2346 
Significance levels:  + p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.  
N = 222 
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Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) DV: CAR2 0.02 0.1 -0.31 0.56 1                 
                         
       222                 
                         
(2) DV: CAR3 0.02 0.09 -0.2 0.55 0.8861 1               
       0                 
       222 222               
                         
(3) RDint 0.07 0.08 0 0.66 -0.025 -0.0001 1             
       0.8078 0.9995               
       97 97 97             
                         
(4) PCint 0.31 0.33 0.01 1.86 0.0423 0.0013 0.042 1           
       0.5411 0.9847 0.6896             
       211 211 93 211           
                         
(5) ADint 0.03 0.03 0 0.16 -0.0234 0.0101 -0.0783 0.0274 1         
       0.8121 0.9179 0.6051 0.7802           
       106 106 46 106 106         
                         
(6) LRint 0.25 0.13 0.04 0.66 -0.1976 -0.1843 -0.1724 0.0676 -0.2428 1       
       0.1118 0.1385 0.7116 0.5956 0.232         
       66 66 7 64 26 66       
                         
(7) Firm Size 9.73 1.96 4.94 14.74 -0.0052 -0.0555 0.3087 0.0244 -0.4039 -0.4191 1     
       0.9386 0.4138 0.0021 0.725 0 0.0005       
       219 219 97 211 106 66 219     
                         
(8) CorpLevel 0.84 0.37 0 1 0.0847 0.0746 0.06 -0.0378 -0.2229 0.0586 0.0204 1   
       0.2084 0.2684 0.5597 0.5855 0.0216 0.6399 0.7641     
       222 222 97 211 106 66 219 222   
                         
(9) Rlastyr 0.75 0.44 0 1 -0.0833 -0.024 0.1426 -0.187 0.0125 0.1391 0.0852 0.1384 1 
       0.2163 0.7219 0.1636 0.0065 0.899 0.2652 0.2091 0.0393   
       222 222 97 211 106 66 219 222 222 
Correlations are followed by p-values and number of observations.
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Table 5:  Regression Results (20-day window) 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 Model 5 Model 6a Model 6 Model 7 
Independent Variables          
R&D Intensity  -0.103  -0.0896 -0.618†  -0.518** -0.821*  
  (0.678)  (0.719) (0.061)  (0.009) (0.013)  
Physical Capital Intensity   0.0431 0.0477 -0.382     
   (0.177) (0.641) (0.148)     
R&D Intensity * Physical Capital Intensity     3.405*     
     (0.038)     
Advertising Intensity      0.917** 0.583 0.0842  
      (0.004) (0.756) (0.965)  
Advertising Intensity * R&D Intensity        13.41  
        (0.210)  
Labor Intensity         -0.561† 
         (0.063) 
Control Variables          
Firm Size -0.00314 0.00250 -0.00596 -0.000339 -0.00200 -0.00264 0.0155 0.00967 -0.0195 
 (0.640) (0.659) (0.415) (0.955) (0.725) (0.764) (0.145) (0.279) (0.306) 
CorpLevel 0.0290† -0.0104 0.0292† -0.00393 0.00697 0.0425 -0.118* -0.112** 0.0820* 
 (0.054) (0.725) (0.052) (0.902) (0.802) (0.578) (0.011) (0.002) (0.026) 
RlastYr 0.00216 0.0111 0.00419 0.00809 0.00719 0.00948 0.0130 0.0136 -0.0583 
 (0.891) (0.603) (0.802) (0.700) (0.745) (0.629) (0.748) (0.744) (0.106) 
2-digit SIC codes23 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.00703 -0.0370 -0.0916 -0.0986 0.639 -0.0725 0.00196 0.0474 0.344 
 (0.888) (0.537) (0.238) (0.620) (0.178) (0.359) (0.981) (0.628) (0.123) 
          
Observations 219 97 211 93 93 106 46 46 66 
R2 0.300 0.182 0.315 0.207 0.250 0.480 0.384 0.397 0.542 
          
Robust p-value in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
23 2-digit SIC code industry controls are fully enumerated in appendix Table 8. 
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Table 6:  Regression Results (15-day window) 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 Model 5 Model6a Model 6 Model 7 
Independent Variables          
R&D Intensity  -0.00503  0.0273 -0.472†  -0.202 -0.235  
  (0.981)  (0.900) (0.056)  (0.307) (0.463)  
Physical Capital Intensity   0.000307 0.0126 -0.394*     
   (0.989) (0.885) (0.035)     
R&D Intensity * Physical Capital Intensity     3.221**     
     (0.007)     
Advertising Intensity      0.764* -1.258 -1.313  
      (0.033) (0.515) (0.559)  
Advertising Intensity * R&D Intensity        1.487  
        (0.898)  
Labor Intensity         -0.351 
         (0.132) 
Control Variables          
Firm Size -0.00675 -0.00152 -0.00906 -0.00530 -0.00687 -0.00547 0.00878 0.00813 -0.0246 
 (0.260) (0.762) (0.168) (0.325) (0.186) (0.388) (0.352) (0.423) (0.177) 
CorpLevel 0.00910 0.00293 0.00955 0.00635 0.0167 0.0164 -0.0239 -0.0233 0.0300 
 (0.388) (0.897) (0.355) (0.782) (0.417) (0.652) (0.510) (0.554) (0.223) 
RlastYr 0.00633 0.00462 0.00641 0.00163 0.000791 0.0144 0.0100 0.0101 -0.0617† 
 (0.681) (0.827) (0.693) (0.939) (0.970) (0.412) (0.803) (0.806) (0.096) 
2-digit SIC codes24 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.0680 -0.0232 0.0546 -0.0135 0.684* -0.00211 0.0776 0.0826 0.306 
 (0.124) (0.647) (0.382) (0.936) (0.041) (0.968) (0.327) (0.443) (0.138) 
          
Observations 219 97 211 93 93 106 46 46 66 
R2 0.211 0.176 0.225 0.202 0.240 0.331 0.299 0.300 0.397 
          
Robust p-value in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
 
 
 
                                                            
24 2-digit SIC code industry controls are fully enumerated in appendix Table 9. 
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this dissertation, I examined the relationship between a firm’s investments in training 
and its subsequent financial performance. These investments in training and related human 
capital management practices are one of the primary methods by which firms develop the human 
capital of their employees.  Making these investments and developing a knowledgeable, capable 
well-trained workforce is often assumed to be an increasingly important prerequisite for survival 
and effectively competing in today’s knowledge-based economy.  Yet despite the economic 
importance to firms of engaging in these training and related activities aimed at developing the 
human capital of their employees, little management research has attempted to directly examine 
the relationship between these activities and firm-level measures of financial performance.   
 Due, at least in part, to the intangible nature of human capital and the variety of 
measurement difficulties this creates, secondary data sources providing measures of firm 
expenditures in this area have generally been unavailable to researchers.  Accounting 
conventions do not permit firms to record these expenditures as “investments,” and, in fact, firms 
are not required to make any separate disclosure of these expenditures in public financial 
statements.  The result is that most firms do not disclose this information.   
 Even where this information is available, measuring the association with financial 
measures of firm performance remains difficult.  The relationship within the firm between 
training and various performance measures is often complex, and is sometimes causally 
ambiguous.  Also, for annual accounting-based measures of financial performance, isolating the 
effect of training from the large number of other activities performed by the firm throughout the 
year is quite difficult. 
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 The result has been that management researchers have often found it necessary to use 
either self-reported or non-financial measures of performance.  I believe the interpretation of 
results related to non-financial measures of performance is a potential concern, as studies 
utilizing these measures sometimes suggest, or will allow the reader to infer, a positive 
association with improved financial performance when there isn’t necessarily any relationship at 
all between these two types of performance measures (non-financial and financial).  Under 
assumptions of perfect competition, investments in training will generate only normal returns.  In 
other words, “future productivity [a non-financial measure] can be improved only at a cost” 
(Becker, 1993: 31).  Discussions in resource-based literature of “imperfect” (Barney, 1986) or 
“incomplete” (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) strategic factor markets also emphasize that the full cost 
of resources used to implement product market strategies needs to be considered before a 
determination can be made as to whether a successfully-implemented product market strategy 
has actually improved a firm’s profitability.  Aside from luck, improved economic performance 
is said to result through either closer analysis, and more accurate evaluation, of the resources and 
capabilities a firm already controls (Barney, 1986), or through choosing appropriate time paths 
of ‘flow” variables necessary to build the required “stocks” of strategic assets that will determine 
competitive position and potential profitability (Dierickx & Cool, 1989: 1510).  Whether 
strategic factor markets (including those related to training) are “imperfect” or “incomplete,” 
there do not appear to be any general “rules for riches” (Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, 1991: 12; 
Barney & Arikan, 2001: 171).  So, while we might often expect to observe (at least within a 
range) a general rule that increased expenditures on a given factor of production may result in 
increased non-financial (i.e. productivity) measures of performance, the same relationship 
between these expenditures and financial measures of performance is not a general rule.  And, as 
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the relationship between training expenditures and financial performance is not a given, the 
relationship between productivity gains generated by these training expenditures and financial 
performance is also not a given.  Or, at least this relationship has yet to be well established 
empirically in the literature.  The exact nature of the relationship between training activities (and 
the strategic factors or assets they may help develop) and firm-level measures of financial 
performance remains an interesting, important and seldom-examined topic, and therefore an 
appropriate focus of this dissertation. 
 In my first research question, I ask “whether firms benefit, financially, from their 
investments in training and human capital management.”  I use event study methodology and 
conduct several parametric and non-parametric tests to determine whether firms receiving an 
award for their “excellence in training and human capital management” have significant 
abnormal stock returns.  After completing the event study, I then use the abnormal return 
measures for each firm in subsequent regression analysis related to my second research question, 
that is “what are the firm-level factors that affect the extent to which firms benefit?” 
  
Research Implications 
I use an event study to test whether there is a market reaction to a firm receiving an award 
for its “excellence in training and human capital management.”  Due to the specific questions 
and methodology used by Training magazine in determining winning firms, I am able to attribute 
these awards as being related to those HR activities specific to the training of employees. 
Further, as these awards include information regarding newer training initiatives of firms, I 
maintain that a substantial portion of any abnormal market reaction to these awards will reflect 
the market’s estimation of the asset value (in excess of training costs) of the human capital 
developed through this training.  In addition, the financial markets consider the expected value 
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that this new information will have in other markets and to various additional internal and 
external stakeholders.  Presumably these include the labor market, where an award may help 
build a reputation and allow a firm to more efficiently attract, hire and retain qualified workers.  
Current and potential suppliers are likely to become more confident that any integrated 
operations will run more efficiently when a potential buyer has well-trained employees.  
Customers may gain additional confidence that they are buying quality products, perhaps 
allowing the firm to command a price premium for its products.   
 The specific characteristics of this training award allowed me to conduct an event study 
with significant potential implications for research.  First, this study is one of the few to obtain a 
firm-level financial measure of performance attributable to a firm’s excellence in training.  Being 
a financial measure, these abnormal returns provide a more direct measure of the returns to 
training than many productivity and other non-financial measures.  Also, the event study allows 
me to separate performance resulting from training from performance resulting from the many 
other activities a firm performs throughout the year more precisely than would be possible using 
annual accounting-based measures of financial performance.   
 In addition to the benefits of using an event study in this context, I believe that this 
particular event study contributes to research in that it is better able to capture within its 
performance measure the financial markets reaction to expected changes in human capital within 
the firm than prior human resource-related event studies.  Most prior event studies from within 
the HR literature have emphasized the benefits of having the correct “bundle” of human resource 
activities or of being named to one of the various “best employer” awards, but have not 
attempted to isolate the benefits of training or developing human capital.  Studies in this area 
usually examine the effect of these awards on the value of a firm’s labor market reputation.  In 
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fact, some have held constant “the effects of the actual HRM practices that cause the formation 
of the firm’s reputation” (Chauvin & Guthrie, 1994: 546) in order to focus on the reputation.  I 
have taken a different perspective.  While there are multiple mechanisms, including labor market 
reputation, by which training awards can impact financial performance, at least some portion of 
the abnormal returns results from the financial markets’ evaluation of the future benefits within 
the firm as a direct result of training.  To research in Strategy and Strategic HR, my findings lend 
support to the empirical human capital research that uses non-financial measures of performance.  
And, methodologically, I provide some evidence that certain awards may impact firm value for 
reasons beyond reputation – if the awards contain information new to the financial markets, then 
changes in valuation will also reflect net benefits expected to occur within the firm (in excess of 
costs) as a result of the activities within the firm that lead to the award.   
 
Managerial Implications 
 The findings in this dissertation also have important implications for managers.  First is 
the corroboration that, yes, training matters.  Managers can be reassured that these activities do 
have value within the firm, and also in labor and other markets, and that financial markets 
recognize this value (once they are aware of the investments).  Top management may want to 
consider better insulating mid-level managers who are making many of the decisions regarding 
training expenditures from the pressures that result from being forced to “expense” training 
activities that are clearly an investment for the firm.  As human capital is an intangible asset that 
financial markets will generally have less than complete information about, managers concerned 
about accurate valuation may consider attempting to more accurately record and more fully 
report this information.  However, this should be done with caution, since detailed reporting of 
training activities and the development of intangible assets within the firm will also make this 
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information available to competitors.  I see participation in a credible training award contest as a 
prudent middle ground.  Firms can release the necessary detailed information to the awarding 
organization under a confidentiality agreement, and, if they are successful in receiving an award, 
some portion of any undervaluation may be corrected when the financial markets receive this 
information.    
 
Limitations 
This dissertation makes important contributions to theory and empirical work in Strategy 
and Strategic Human Resource Management, and in addition has important managerial 
implications, but it does have its limitations.   
 At least in part due to a variety of measurement issues, perfect measures of a firm’s 
investments in human capital and the resulting effects on performance are often unattainable.  I 
take a novel approach within the Strategy literature to measuring human capital by using an 
event study methodology where the “event” is an award firms receive that is specific to its 
investments in training and related human capital activities.25 But my measure, as with any other, 
does have limitations.  First is my use of a training award as a measure or proxy for the human 
capital itself.  The human capital itself is a difficult-to-observe construct.  So, in my study, as in 
most others, the measure of human capital is at least a step removed from actually measuring the 
changes in an employee’s knowledge, know-how, skills, and abilities.  Also, I do not claim that 
financial markets are directly evaluating and reacting to any precise numerical figures (regarding 
either training expenditures or firm rankings within the award list) released at the time of award.  
                                                            
25 As opposed to extant HR-related event studies primarily in the HR and Strategic HR literatures that 
often focus more on the performance of the overall bundle of HR activities and the more general positive 
perception of a firm’s HR this provides the public and investors (i.e., “ Top 100 places to work,” “Best 
firms for working mothers,” etc.).  Although these studies are extremely valuable in their own right, I 
believe this study is the first within Strategy using an event that comes close to isolating those portions of 
HR activities directly related to the development and management of human capital. 
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I take a more conservative position in merely asserting that, in this world of incomplete 
information regarding training and human capital investments, this award provides new 
information to the financial (and other) markets that increased training has recently occurred, and 
that the award-winning firms are committed to developing the human capital of their employees.   
 My performance measure, the abnormal returns obtained from my event study requires an 
acceptance of the (semi-strong form) efficient market hypothesis, which states that all publicly-
available information regarding firms will be fully and immediately imputed into the firm’s 
valuation and its stock price.  This hypothesis does not state that the market reaction based on 
expected changes in the discounted value of a firm’s future cash flows will be perfect in every 
individual instance, but it does require the reader to accept that these bumps in stock price that 
occur over narrow “event windows’ will be unbiased in their valuation of new information.   
 The need to use multiple samples in my regression hypotheses testing H2-H7 (see 
Models 2-7 in Tables 5, 6) might also be considered a limitation.  In Appendix Table 7, I report 
the composition of observations in each sample; there is little overlap.  When collecting 
independent variables to examine possible complementarity between a firm’s human capital and 
its other strategic assets, it became apparent that gaps existed in the public reporting (in 
Compustat) of these variables.  For instance, although my full sample contains 219 observations 
(instances of a firm winning an award in a given year), in only 97 of those observations did the 
firm in question report its R&D expenditures for that year.  A comprehensive model including all 
independent and control variables would have resulted in a sample of only 2 firms.  So, in order 
to preserve the number of observations used to test each hypothesis, it was necessary to create 6 
separate sub-samples (see Models 2-7 in Tables 5, 6) based on the availability (Compustat 
reporting) of each independent variable.  This necessitates more caution when directly 
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comparing results across the various models, but a comparison of descriptive statistics across 
samples reveals few obvious differences, aside from the number of observations in each sample.  
Also, the interpretations of each individual model remain informative and provide valuable 
insights regarding the overall research questions of my study. 
 A few measures I have yet to consider might also be considered limitations.  In the initial 
coding of these data, great care was taken to code variables obtained from firm financial 
statements (through Compustat) so that data for the fiscal year ending just prior to the award 
would be aligned with the subsequent award year, since awards were announced in either 
February of March, just after the end of most firms’ fiscal years.  So, Intel’s balance sheet data 
for, say, 2006, was directly aligned with their March, 2007 training award.  This simplified 
regressions and eliminated the need for lag variables.  But, I perhaps might have considered 
additional leading or lag measures between the abnormal stock market returns I observed and 
various other accounting-based measures of financial performance. For one, this might 
strengthen my position that it was the training and human capital improving performance, and 
not the other way around.  Also, if these abnormal returns persisted over the next few years it 
would add support to the efficient market hypothesis assumptions necessary when conducting an 
event study. 
 
Future Research 
Given that I have used training awards to provide an indication of a firm’s past 
investments in training and developing human capital, future research may want to use more 
direct, and fine-grained, measures of these investments.  The event study methodology used in 
this dissertation served well in establishing whether there is a financial relationship between 
training (awards) and financial performance, but the coarseness of data used in subsequent 
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regression analysis may have contributed to my more limited success in establishing the factors 
that account for the variation in returns to training expenditures.  A survey instrument may have 
the limitation of self-reported financial measures, but will allow me to obtain more-detailed 
information on training and other human capital development activities.  Also, a survey would 
enable me to obtain measures of the specificity of the human capital, and various forms of 
physical capital, within the firm.  I expect that my proposition regarding the complementarity of 
human capital with the firm’s other strategic investments would have more consistent support if 
measures of specificity were included in regression analysis.  Hence, a survey-based approach 
might be a valuable complement to my dissertation research. 
 In addition to obtaining more fine-grained measures of human capital investments from 
the firm’s perspective, a survey would allow me, at the same time, to also examine these same 
investments from the employee’s perspective.  Future work here will be grounded in Transaction 
Cost Economics reasoning.  As Williamson illustrates in his Simple Contracting Schema (1985: 
33), there is a set of possible contracts between buyers (firms) and suppliers (including 
employees), determined by the presence or absence of specific investments between these two 
parties, and also by the presence or absence of safeguards to protect these parties from potential 
opportunistic behavior of the other party in the contract.  At one extreme, there are only general 
investments, and therefore no safeguards are necessary to induce either party to contract, since 
neither is vulnerable to opportunistic behavior.  These investments could easily be redeployed to 
other uses or sold in the market.  At the other extreme, specific investments have been made 
between these two parties, and safeguards have been provided to protect the parties from the 
potential opportunistic behavior of their trading partner and induce them to contract.  At a third 
point, the specific investments have been made, but no safeguards against opportunistic behavior 
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have been offered.  This situation is “apt to be unstable contractually” (1985: 34).  Why would a 
supplier (a potential new employee, for example) enter into a contractual relationship that would 
require them to make specific investments when no safeguards are offered?  Williamson (1985) 
states that, in the absence of safeguards, a significant price premium would need to be offered to 
induce the supplier to enter contract in a situation where, ex post, they would be subject to 
opportunistic behavior.  The projected breakeven supply price is great (the wage rate required by 
workers at the third point exceeds the extreme).  The third point is considered an inefficient, out- 
of-equilibrium situation that is not expected to persist. 
 I intend to show that a price premium is not the only solution that induces the other party 
to a contract (the employee) to enter contract in the face of specific investments and a lack of 
safeguards. I propose that other “in kind” benefits, of which training and education are 
important, may induce parties to contract in place of safeguards and price premiums.  If the 
combination of safeguards and compensation received by the employee does not appear to reflect 
their increased human capital and specific commitments to the firm, why might this be so?  Why 
would an employee with foresight allow themselves to be put in this situation?  If a situation 
such as this exists and appears to be stable and profitable for the firm, then I would examine 
whether perhaps there were other, non-pecuniary benefits the firm was providing the employees 
that were not easily visible in financial statements.  And, for the firm that attempted to maintain 
an employment relationship where the firm had not provided either increased compensation or 
economic safeguards for the employee’s specific commitments, what might the behavioral and 
performance consequences be for the firm?   
Finally, at the end of this dissertation and the commencement of this research program, I 
hope the work increases our understanding of the financial value to firms of investing in the 
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training and human capital of their employees and the factors affecting the extent of these 
financial returns.  I hope I have highlighted the importance of cost considerations and the non-
obvious relationship between non-financial and financial measures of performance resulting 
from training.  Despite these cost considerations, training expenditures (and the strategic factors 
and assets they help develop) are valued by the financial markets.  Firms that train their 
employees are more likely to develop the idiosyncratic skills and capabilities difficult for 
competitors to imitate.  In addition, current and potential employees value this commitment from 
the firm, perhaps benefiting the firm with regards to discretionary employee effort, and making 
job market activities, such as recruitment and selection, more efficient.  In short, training matters. 
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Appendix Table 7:   Observations in each model 
 
 
Firm Award Year 
Award 
Ranking 
Model 
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4a 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
6a 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
1-800-Flowers.com 2006 77 X  X   X    
1-800-Flowers.com 2007 18 X  X   X    
1-800-Flowers.com 2008 36 X  X   X    
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 
Inc. 2005 27 X  X      X 
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 
Inc. 2006 26 X  X      X 
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 
Inc. 2007 69 X  X      X 
ADP, Inc. 2008 20 X X X X X     
Aetna Inc 2005 42 X  X       
Aetna Inc 2006 36 X  X       
Aetna Inc 2007 23 X  X      X 
Aetna Inc 2008 13 X  X      X 
Aflac, Inc. 2005 51 X  X   X    
Aflac, Inc. 2006 54 X  X   X    
Aflac, Inc. 2007 46 X  X   X    
Aflac, Inc. 2008 33 X  X   X    
Allstate Insurance 
Company 2005 48 X  X       
Allstate Insurance 
Company 2006 30 X  X       
Allstate Insurance 
Company 2007 31 X  X       
Allstate Insurance 
Company 2008 27 X  X       
ALLTEL 2005 77 X  X   X    
ALLTEL 2006 72 X  X   X    
ALLTEL 2007 37 X  X   X    
American Express (also 
American Express 
Operations Training) 
2006 31 X  X      X 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Firm Award Year 
Award 
Ranking 
Model 
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4a 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
6a 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
American Express (also 
American Express 
Operations Training) 
2007 91 X  X      X 
Ameriprise Financial 
Minneapolis MN 
Finance/Banking 
2008 119 X  X       
Applied Materials, Inc. 2005 47 X X X X X     
Applied Materials, Inc. 2006 38 X X X X X     
Applied Materials, Inc. 2007 60 X X X X X     
Applied Materials, Inc. 2008 88 X X X X X     
BB&T Corporation 2005 34 X  X   X   X 
BB&T Corporation 2006 19 X  X   X   X 
BB&T Corporation 2007 40 X  X   X   X 
BB&T Corporation 2008 18 X  X   X   X 
Best Buy 2005 65 X  X   X    
Best Buy 2007 105 X  X   X    
Best Buy 2008 44 X  X   X    
BMO Financial Group 2005 16 X  X      X 
BMO Financial Group 2006 14 X  X      X 
BMO Financial Group 2007 22 X  X      X 
Capital One Financial 
Corp. 2005 18 X  X      X 
Capital One Financial 
Corp. 2006 18 X  X      X 
Capital One Financial 
Corp. 2007 54 X  X      X 
Capital One Financial 
Corp. 2008 15 X  X      X 
CarMax, Inc. 2008 47 X X X X X X X X  
Caterpillar, Inc. 2007 121 X X X X X    X 
Caterpillar, Inc. 2008 84 X X X X X    X 
Cendant Mortgage 2005 40 X  X   X    
Cerner Corp. 2005 81 X X X X X     
Cerner Corp. 2006 48 X X X X X     
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
 
Firm Award Year 
Award 
Ranking 
Model 
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4a 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
6a 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
Cerner Corp. 2007 13 X X X X X     
Cerner Corp. 2008 21 X X X X X     
Choice Hotels 
International 2006 86 X X X X X X X X  
Choice Hotels 
International 2007 92 X X X X X X X X  
Choice Hotels 
International 2008 102 X X X X X X X X  
Commerce Bancorp, Inc. 2008 50 X  X   X   X 
CompuCredit Corporation 2008 70 X  X      X 
Constellation Energy 
Group 2007 116 X  X       
Convergys Corporation 2007 110 X X X X X     
Convergys Corporation 2008 80 X X X X X     
DaVita, Inc. 2005 95 X X X X X     
DaVita, Inc. 2006 60 X X X X X     
DaVita, Inc. 2007 59 X X X X X     
DaVita, Inc. 2008 77 X X X X X     
Delta Air Lines, Inc. 2008 69 X  X   X   X 
EMC Corp. 2005 69 X X X X X X X X  
EMC Corp. 2006 37 X X X X X X X X  
EMC Corp. 2007 3 X X X X X X X X  
EMC Corp. 2008 2 X X X X X X X X  
Equity Residential 2005 62 X X        
Equity Residential 2006 52 X X        
Equity Residential 2007 62 X X        
Equity Residential 2008 83 X X        
Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd. 2007 35 X X X X X     
General Mills, Inc. 2005 11 X X X X X X X X  
General Mills, Inc. 2006 10 X X X X X X X X  
General Mills, Inc. 2007 5 X X X X X X X X  
General Mills, Inc. 2008 7 X X X X X X X X  
Healthways, Inc. 2007 98 X  X       
Healthways, Inc. 2008 89 X  X       
112 
 
 
Table 7 (continued)  
 
 
Firm Award Year 
Award 
Ranking 
Model 
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4a 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
6a 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
HSBC North America 2005 35 X  X      X 
HSBC North America 2006 44 X  X      X 
HSBC North America 2007 36 X  X      X 
HSBC North America 2008 42 X  X      X 
IKON Office Solutions, 
Inc. 2005 64 X  X   X    
IKON Office Solutions, 
Inc. 2006 66 X  X   X    
IKON Office Solutions, 
Inc. 2007 93 X  X   X    
IKON Office Solutions, 
Inc. 2008 91 X  X   X    
Intel Corp. 2005 17 X X X X X X X X  
Intel Corp. 2006 16 X X X X X X X X  
Intel Corp. 2007 70 X X X X X X X X  
inVentiv Commercial 
Services 2005 63 X  X       
inVentiv Commercial 
Services 2006 63 X  X       
inVentiv Commercial 
Services 2007 20 X  X       
inVentiv Commercial 
Services 2008 17 X  X       
J.B. Hunt Transport 
Services, Inc. 2005 91 X  X      X 
J.B. Hunt Transport 
Services, Inc. 2006 79 X  X      X 
J.B. Hunt Transport 
Services, Inc. 2007 73 X  X      X 
J.B. Hunt Transport 
Services, Inc. 2008 81 X  X      X 
Johnson Controls, Inc. 2005 24 X X X X X     
Johnson Controls, Inc. 2006 41 X X X X X     
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Table 7 (continued)  
 
 
Firm Award Year 
Award 
Ranking 
Model 
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4a 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
6a 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
Johnson Controls, Inc. 2007 84 X X X X X     
KLA-Tencor 2005 5 X X X X X X X X  
KLA-Tencor 2006 9 X X X X X X X X  
KLA-Tencor 2007 21 X X X X X X X X  
Lockheed Martin 2005 8 X X X X X     
Lockheed Martin 2006 5 X X X X X     
Lockheed Martin 2007 11 X X X X X     
Lockheed Martin 2008 12 X X X X X     
American Power 
Conversion 2006 90 X X X X X X X X  
Loews Hotels 2007 75 X  X       
Loews Hotels 2008 59 X  X       
Marriott International, Inc. 2008 75 X X X X X     
MasterCard Worldwide 2007 108 X  X       
MasterCard Worldwide 2008 79 X  X       
McDonald's USA, LLC 2007 41 X  X   X   X 
McDonald's USA, LLC 2008 37 X  X   X   X 
MetLife 2007 123 X        X 
Microchip Technology 
Incorporated 2008 93 X X X X X     
Microsoft Corp. 2005 38 X X X X X X X X  
Microsoft Corp. 2006 23 X X X X X X X X  
Microsoft Corp. 2007 19 X X X X X X X X  
Microsoft Corp. 2008 9 X X X X X X X X  
Mohawk Industries, Inc. 2007 64 X  X   X    
Mohawk Industries, Inc. 2008 19 X  X   X    
Nationwide Insurance 2008 74 X         
Northwest Airlines, Inc 
(Eagan, MN 
Transportation/Utilities) 
2008 110 X  X   X   X 
Orkin 2005 57 X  X   X    
Orkin 2006 74 X  X   X    
Orkin 2007 113 X  X   X    
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Table 7 (continued)  
 
 
Firm Award Year 
Award 
Ranking 
Model 
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4a 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
6a 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
Orkin 2008 92 X  X   X    
PAETEC 
Communications, Inc. 2007 97 X  X       
PAETEC 
Communications, Inc. 2008 66 X  X       
Paychex, Inc. 2005 20 X  X      X 
Paychex, Inc. 2006 21 X  X      X 
Paychex, Inc. 2007 34 X  X      X 
Paychex, Inc. 2008 30 X  X      X 
Pinnacle Entertainment, 
Inc. 2008 60 X  X   X    
Principal Financial Group 2007 89 X  X       
Principal Financial Group 2008 68 X  X       
QUALCOMM 2005 25 X X X X X     
QUALCOMM 2006 56 X X X X X     
QUALCOMM 2007 90 X X X X X     
QUALCOMM 2008 101 X X X X X     
sanofi-aventis 
pharmaceuticals 2007 112 X X X X X    X 
sanofi-aventis 
pharmaceuticals 2008 104 X X X X X    X 
Satyam Computer 
Services Limited 2007 15 X X X X X X X X  
Satyam Computer 
Services Limited 2008 11 X X X X X X X X  
Scotiabank 2005 71 X  X      X 
Scotiabank 2006 47 X  X      X 
Scotiabank 2007 12 X  X      X 
Scotiabank 2008 14 X  X      X 
Starbucks Coffee 
Company 2005 93 X X X X X X X X  
Starbucks Coffee 
Company 2006 91 X X X X X X X X  
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Table 7 (continued)  
 
 
Firm Award Year 
Award 
Ranking 
Model 
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4a 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
6a 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
Starbucks Coffee 
Company 2007 55 X X X X X X X X  
Steelcase, Inc. 2005 43 X X X X X     
Steelcase, Inc. 2006 42 X X X X X     
Steelcase, Inc. 2007 49 X X X X X     
Steelcase, Inc. 2008 41 X X X X X     
Tandus 2008 53 X  X       
The Home Depot 2006 59 X X X X X X X X  
The Home Depot 2007 43 X X X X X X X X  
The Home Depot 2008 64 X X X X X X X X  
PNC Financial Services 
Group 2005 67 X  X   X   X 
PNC Financial Services 
Group 2006 69 X  X   X   X 
PNC Financial Services 
Group 2007 68 X  X   X   X 
PNC Financial Services 
Group 2008 48 X  X   X   X 
The Reynolds & Reynolds 
Co. 2005 29 X X X X X     
The Reynolds & Reynolds 
Co. 2006 24 X X X X X     
Unisys Corporation 
Managed Services 2007 106 X X X X X X X X  
UPS 2007 67 X  X      X 
UPS 2008 49 X  X      X 
Wachovia 2005 22 X  X   X   X 
Wachovia 2006 22 X  X   X   X 
Wachovia 2007 48 X  X   X   X 
Wachovia 2008 31 X  X   X   X 
Wells Fargo & Co. 2005 30 X  X   X   X 
Wells Fargo & Co. 2006 25 X  X   X   X 
Wells Fargo & Co. 2007 38 X  X   X   X 
Wells Fargo & Co. 2008 22 X  X   X   X 
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Table 7 (continued)  
 
 
Firm Award Year 
Award 
Ranking 
Model 
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4a 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
6a 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
Windstream 
Communications 2007 58 X  X   X    
Windstream 
Communications 2008 52 X  X   X    
AstraZeneca 2006 62 X X X X X    X 
Bausch & Lomb 2005 39 X X X X X X X X  
Shaw Industries 2005 96 X  X       
Shaw Industries 2006 92 X  X       
Boston Scientific 2005 83 X X X X X     
Caesars Entertainment 2005 88 X X X X X X X X  
Callaway Golf Company 2005 61 X X X X X X X X  
Bankers Life and Casualty 2005 99 X        X 
Guidant Corporation 2005 78 X X X X X     
Hewlett-Packard Co. 2006 85 X X X X X X X X  
IBM 2005 1 X X X X X X X X  
IBM 2006 2 X X X X X X X X  
Merck Manufacturing 
Division 2006 96 X X X X X     
PETCO Animal Supplies, 
Inc. 2005 68 X X X X X X X X  
PETCO Animal Supplies, 
Inc. 2006 88 X X X X X X X X  
Pfizer 2005 3 X X X X X X X X  
Pfizer 2006 8 X X X X X X X X  
Prudential Financial, Inc. 2005 33 X         
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 2005 74 X X X X X     
Sprint 2005 4 X  X   X    
Thomson West 2005 70 X X X X X X X X X 
Thomson West 2006 75 X X X X X X X X X 
United Technologies Corp. 2005 72 X X X X X     
Advance Auto Parts 2005 55 X X X X X X X X  
Advance Auto Parts 2006 82 X X X X X X X X  
Fedex Express 2006 83 X  X   X   X 
117 
 
Table 7 (continued)  
 
 
Firm Award Year 
Award 
Ranking 
Model 
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
Model 
4a 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model 
6a 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
International Truck and 
Engine Corp. 2005 90 X X X X X     
Nextel Communications 2005 45 X  X   X    
Regions Financial 
Corporation 2005 66 X  X   X   X 
Regions Financial 
Corporation 2006 46 X  X   X   X 
Verizon Communications, 
Inc. 2005 73 X  X   X    
Verizon Communications, 
Inc. 2006 84 X  X   X    
Pitney Bowes Global 
Mainstream Solutions 2006 94 X X X X X     
Century 21 Real Estate 2005 85 X  X   X    
Century 21 Real Estate 2006 97 X  X   X    
Cendant Mobility 2005 84 X  X   X    
Cendant Mobility 2006 65 X  X   X    
Cendant Real Estate 2006 70 X  X   X    
 
   219 97 211 93 93 106 46 46 66 
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Appendix Table 8:  alternate version of Table 5, with all industry controls (2-digit SIC codes) enumerated 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 Model 5 Model 6a Model 6 Model 7 
Independent Variables          
R&D Intensity  -0.103  -0.0896 -0.618†  -0.518** -0.821*  
  (0.678)  (0.719) (0.061)  (0.009) (0.013)  
Physical Capital Intensity   0.0431 0.0477 -0.382     
   (0.177) (0.641) (0.148)     
R&D Intensity * Physical Capital Intensity     3.405*     
     (0.038)     
Advertising Intensity      0.917** 0.583 0.0842  
      (0.004) (0.756) (0.965)  
Advertising Intensity * R&D Intensity        13.41  
        (0.210)  
Labor Intensity         -0.561† 
         (0.063) 
          
Control Variables          
Firm Size -0.00314 0.00250 -0.00596 -0.000339 -0.00200 -0.00264 0.0155 0.00967 -0.0195 
 (0.640) (0.659) (0.415) (0.955) (0.725) (0.764) (0.145) (0.279) (0.306) 
CorpLevel 0.0290† -0.0104 0.0292† -0.00393 0.00697 0.0425 -0.118* -0.112** 0.0820* 
 (0.054) (0.725) (0.052) (0.902) (0.802) (0.578) (0.011) (0.002) (0.026) 
RlastYr 0.00216 0.0111 0.00419 0.00809 0.00719 0.00948 0.0130 0.0136 -0.0583 
 (0.891) (0.603) (0.802) (0.700) (0.745) (0.629) (0.748) (0.744) (0.106) 
SIC_2DN==20 -0.0108 0.00980 0.103† 0.0838 -0.545 0.00270 -0.0704 -0.0475  
 (0.618) (0.641) (0.059) (0.582) (0.161) (0.925) (0.152) (0.201)  
SIC_2DN==22 0.147***  0.259***   0.198***    
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)    
SIC_2DN==25 5.04e-05 0.0232 0.114* 0.0987 -0.566     
 (0.997) (0.273) (0.035) (0.546) (0.173)     
SIC_2DN==27 -0.0337† -0.0370 0.0816 0.0428 -0.619 0.0302 -0.173† -0.158†  
 (0.077) (0.296) (0.165) (0.812) (0.146) (0.760) (0.094) (0.061)  
SIC_2DN==28 -0.00247 0.0247 0.111† 0.0953 -0.586 0.0228 0.0126 -0.0321 -0.117 
 (0.952) (0.618) (0.068) (0.540) (0.156) (0.651) (0.837) (0.468) (0.169) 
SIC_2DN==35 0.0260 0.0529 0.143* 0.129 -0.528 0.0399 -0.00890 0.0262 -0.00335 
 (0.400) (0.118) (0.019) (0.436) (0.197) (0.318) (0.943) (0.796) (0.970) 
SIC_2DN==36 0.0174 0.0554 0.129* 0.124 -0.552 -0.0165 -0.0334 -0.0617  
 (0.540) (0.192) (0.017) (0.425) (0.176) (0.675) (0.560) (0.223)  
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SIC_2DN==37 0.00883 0.0243 0.129* 0.106 -0.569     
 (0.761) (0.410) (0.038) (0.536) (0.177)     
SIC_2DN==38 0.0158 0.0609 0.128* 0.131 -0.544 0.0896*** 0.116 0.162  
 (0.450) (0.141) (0.019) (0.444) (0.195) (0.000) (0.369) (0.133)  
SIC_2DN==39  0.0406† 0.109* 0.110 -0.563     
  (0.090) (0.033) (0.504) (0.179)     
SIC_2DN==42 0.0739**  0.179***      0.0821 
 (0.005)  (0.001)      (0.166) 
SIC_2DN==45 0.336***  0.441***   0.394***   0.283** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001) 
SIC_2DN==48 0.00706  0.0953*   0.0407    
 (0.754)  (0.034)   (0.274)    
SIC_2DN==49 0.0776***  0.184***       
 (0.000)  (0.000)       
SIC_2DN==50 -0.0747***  0.0426   -0.0205    
 (0.000)  (0.438)   (0.379)    
SIC_2DN==51 0.0648***  0.177**       
 (0.000)  (0.003)       
SIC_2DN==52 0.0842** 0.101*** 0.198*** 0.174 -0.420 0.128** 0.0206 0.0384  
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.230) (0.250) (0.004) (0.841) (0.647)  
SIC_2DN==55 0.0835** 0.117** 0.195** 0.188 -0.472 0.123** 0.0723 0.0755  
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.248) (0.246) (0.005) (0.401) (0.326)  
SIC_2DN==57 -0.0361*  0.0839   0.00140    
 (0.034)  (0.140)   (0.964)    
SIC_2DN==58 -0.0436* -0.0304 0.0551 0.0372 -0.571 -0.00739 -0.0775 -0.0749 -0.105 
 (0.034) (0.166) (0.204) (0.800) (0.131) (0.791) (0.399) (0.351) (0.206) 
SIC_2DN==59 0.0223 -0.0253 0.132† 0.0411 -0.616 -0.0171 -0.0610 -0.0585  
 (0.694) (0.173) (0.096) (0.794) (0.130) (0.432) (0.230) (0.186)  
SIC_2DN==60 0.0205  0.145*   0.0865   0.0365 
 (0.630)  (0.036)   (0.119)   (0.727) 
SIC_2DN==61 0.111  0.235*      0.0232 
 (0.277)  (0.040)      (0.862) 
SIC_2DN==62 -0.00512  0.111      0.122 
 (0.909)  (0.114)      (0.168) 
SIC_2DN==63 0.00421  0.125†   0.0209   -0.107 
 (0.902)  (0.051)   (0.617)   (0.345) 
SIC_2DN==67 -0.0155 0.0156 0.0521 0.0572 -0.646 -0.126*** -0.0994 -0.0490  
 (0.595) (0.601) (0.328) (0.735) (0.139) (0.000) (0.517) (0.764)  
SIC_2DN==70 0.0631 0.101 0.175 0.169 -0.475     
 (0.540) (0.322) (0.148) (0.371) (0.237)     
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SIC_2DN==73 -0.0215 0.00774 0.0934† 0.0824 -0.587 0.0210 -0.0505 -0.0352  
 (0.207) (0.778) (0.087) (0.617) (0.160) (0.709) (0.656) (0.706)  
SIC_2DN==75 0.0315  0.133*   0.0172    
 (0.347)  (0.017)   (0.864)    
SIC_2DN==79 -0.0455*     -0.000515 -0.0590 -0.0496  
 (0.012)     (0.989) (0.548) (0.562)  
SIC_2DN==80 0.00349 0.0397* 0.116* 0.112 -0.537     
 (0.751) (0.018) (0.028) (0.473) (0.180)     
SIC_2DN==87 0.0181  0.133*      0.0478 
 (0.177)  (0.014)      (0.266) 
SIC_2DN==99 0.0369  0.165*       
 (0.370)  (0.026)       
Constant 0.00703 -0.0370 -0.0916 -0.0986 0.639 -0.0725 0.00196 0.0474 0.344 
 (0.888) (0.537) (0.238) (0.620) (0.178) (0.359) (0.981) (0.628) (0.123) 
          
Observations 219 97 211 93 93 106 46 46 66 
R-squared 0.300 0.182 0.315 0.207 0.250 0.480 0.384 0.397 0.542 
          
Robust p-value in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 9:  alternate version of Table 6, with all industry controls (2-digit SIC codes) enumerated 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 Model 5 Model6a Model 6 Model 7 
Independent Variables          
R&D Intensity  -0.00503  0.0273 -0.472†  -0.202 -0.235  
  (0.981)  (0.900) (0.056)  (0.307) (0.463)  
Physical Capital Intensity   0.000307 0.0126 -0.394*     
   (0.989) (0.885) (0.035)     
R&D Intensity * Physical Capital Intensity     3.221**     
     (0.007)     
Advertising Intensity      0.764* -1.258 -1.313  
      (0.033) (0.515) (0.559)  
Advertising Intensity * R&D Intensity        1.487  
        (0.898)  
Labor Intensity         -0.351 
         (0.132) 
          
Control Variables          
Firm Size -0.00675 -0.00152 -0.00906 -0.00530 -0.00687 -0.00547 0.00878 0.00813 -0.0246 
 (0.260) (0.762) (0.168) (0.325) (0.186) (0.388) (0.352) (0.423) (0.177) 
CorpLevel 0.00910 0.00293 0.00955 0.00635 0.0167 0.0164 -0.0239 -0.0233 0.0300 
 (0.388) (0.897) (0.355) (0.782) (0.417) (0.652) (0.510) (0.554) (0.223) 
RlastYr 0.00633 0.00462 0.00641 0.00163 0.000791 0.0144 0.0100 0.0101 -0.0617† 
 (0.681) (0.827) (0.693) (0.939) (0.970) (0.412) (0.803) (0.806) (0.096) 
SIC_2DN==20 -0.0259 0.0219 0.00951 0.0451 -0.550* -0.0175 -0.100† -0.0977*  
 (0.179) (0.292) (0.818) (0.733) (0.046) (0.411) (0.059) (0.041)  
SIC_2DN==22 0.111***  0.145***   0.153***    
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)    
SIC_2DN==25 -0.000479 0.0526** 0.0323 0.0724 -0.556†     
 (0.968) (0.004) (0.417) (0.607) (0.057)     
SIC_2DN==27 -0.0729*** -0.0242 -0.0404 -0.00408 -0.630* -0.0241 -0.195† -0.193†  
 (0.000) (0.371) (0.307) (0.978) (0.037) (0.662) (0.069) (0.060)  
SIC_2DN==28 -0.0274 0.0145 0.0103 0.0352 -0.609* -0.00381 -0.00707 -0.0120 -0.0352 
 (0.525) (0.750) (0.843) (0.790) (0.039) (0.953) (0.886) (0.834) (0.603) 
SIC_2DN==35 0.0159 0.0628* 0.0516 0.0844 -0.538† 0.0377 -0.115 -0.111 0.0833 
 (0.480) (0.012) (0.233) (0.550) (0.066) (0.240) (0.400) (0.370) (0.243) 
SIC_2DN==36 0.0273 0.0778* 0.0617 0.0942 -0.545† 0.000822 -0.0421 -0.0453  
 (0.233) (0.012) (0.154) (0.502) (0.065) (0.975) (0.417) (0.465)  
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SIC_2DN==37 -0.00296 0.0423* 0.0332 0.0678 -0.571†     
 (0.893) (0.046) (0.456) (0.639) (0.056)     
SIC_2DN==38 -0.00892 0.0462 0.0235 0.0597 -0.578† 0.0621** -0.0498 -0.0446  
 (0.732) (0.238) (0.602) (0.684) (0.055) (0.010) (0.719) (0.717)  
SIC_2DN==39  0.0648** 0.0281 0.0766 -0.560†     
  (0.002) (0.467) (0.592) (0.059)     
SIC_2DN==42 0.0358**  0.0681†      0.116* 
 (0.010)  (0.063)      (0.018) 
SIC_2DN==45 0.149***  0.186***   0.195**   0.175** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.002)   (0.001) 
SIC_2DN==48 0.00277  0.0376   0.0200    
 (0.899)  (0.267)   (0.535)    
SIC_2DN==49 0.0519**  0.0878**       
 (0.004)  (0.009)       
SIC_2DN==50 -0.0396***  -0.00780   0.00409    
 (0.000)  (0.850)   (0.862)    
SIC_2DN==51 0.000840  0.0290       
 (0.922)  (0.465)       
SIC_2DN==52 0.0751** 0.117*** 0.113** 0.143 -0.418 0.108** -0.0537 -0.0517  
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.251) (0.104) (0.002) (0.631) (0.621)  
SIC_2DN==55 0.0542 0.112* 0.0850 0.128 -0.496† 0.0867† -0.0208 -0.0205  
 (0.157) (0.011) (0.109) (0.366) (0.083) (0.079) (0.816) (0.817)  
SIC_2DN==57 -0.0293*  0.00525   0.000135    
 (0.047)  (0.899)   (0.996)    
SIC_2DN==58 -0.0455** 0.00679 -0.0119 0.0239 -0.552* -0.0171 -0.141 -0.140 -0.0135 
 (0.001) (0.744) (0.720) (0.852) (0.039) (0.450) (0.151) (0.149) (0.829) 
SIC_2DN==59 0.0250 -0.00952 0.0519 0.00103 -0.620* -0.00644 -0.112* -0.112*  
 (0.687) (0.543) (0.482) (0.994) (0.031) (0.864) (0.044) (0.042)  
SIC_2DN==60 0.0191  0.0605   0.0681   0.137 
 (0.607)  (0.256)   (0.110)   (0.151) 
SIC_2DN==61 0.108  0.146      0.144 
 (0.266)  (0.151)      (0.218) 
SIC_2DN==62 -0.0154  0.0189      0.138† 
 (0.679)  (0.722)      (0.070) 
SIC_2DN==63 -0.0154  0.0190   -0.00597   0.000866 
 (0.607)  (0.685)   (0.857)   (0.992) 
SIC_2DN==67 -0.0314 0.0261 -0.0495 0.00245 -0.662* -0.131*** 0.0309 0.0365  
 (0.298) (0.429) (0.221) (0.987) (0.032) (0.000) (0.844) (0.846)  
SIC_2DN==70 0.0336 0.0892 0.0650 0.104 -0.505†     
 (0.607) (0.159) (0.393) (0.480) (0.072)     
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SIC_2DN==73 -0.0351* 0.0158 -0.00283 0.0336 -0.600* -0.00337 -0.139 -0.137  
 (0.015) (0.496) (0.944) (0.815) (0.045) (0.932) (0.247) (0.235)  
SIC_2DN==75 -0.00754  0.0300   -0.0264    
 (0.798)  (0.474)   (0.631)    
SIC_2DN==79 -0.0319†     0.00595 -0.150 -0.149  
 (0.096)     (0.857) (0.174) (0.165)  
SIC_2DN==80 -0.0732† 0.0169 -0.0424 0.0358 -0.578*     
 (0.061) (0.284) (0.430) (0.791) (0.042)     
SIC_2DN==87 0.00890  0.0415      0.109** 
 (0.452)  (0.304)      (0.005) 
SIC_2DN==99 0.0159  0.0574       
 (0.657)  (0.280)       
Constant 0.0680 -0.0232 0.0546 -0.0135 0.684* -0.00211 0.0776 0.0826 0.306 
 (0.124) (0.647) (0.382) (0.936) (0.041) (0.968) (0.327) (0.443) (0.138) 
          
Observations 219 97 211 93 93 106 46 46 66 
R-squared 0.211 0.176 0.225 0.202 0.240 0.331 0.299 0.300 0.397 
          
Robust p-value in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
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Appendix of Further Empirical Analysis:  Robustness Checks for Regression Results 
 
 
 Missing data for independent variables needed to test H2-7 necessitated that each 
hypothesis be tested in a separate model.  In each of these models (Models 2-7) a substantial 
number of observations are missing and the possibility exists that any significant results reported 
in Tables 5 and 6 may be the result of systematic differences between firms that do, and those 
that do not, report the relevant data.  For example, in Model 4 in Table 5, in only 93 of 219 
observations did firms report both their R&D and physical capital expenditures.   
 The majority of observations lost from Models 2-7 were lost due to missing data 
regarding firm R&D or advertising expenditures.  Therefore, an initial robustness check was 
conducted in which a value of zero was substituted for all missing R&D and advertising data.  
The rationale for this substitution is that the firms that do not report either R&D or advertising 
expenditures do so because they have little or no expenditures to report in these areas.  
Substituting zeros for the missing data brings the total observations in each of Models 2-6 to 
between 211 and 219 of the total available 219 observations.  Results of this initial robustness 
check are presented in Tables 10 and 11.  In general, this action of substituting values of zero for 
missing R&D and advertising data eliminated all significant findings presented in Tables 5 and 6 
for regression results using abnormal returns from both 20 and 15-day windows.  I will now 
present a more detailed discussion of the coefficients in Tables 10 and 11 for Models 2-7 and 
their support, or lack of support, for hypotheses 2-7 respectively. 
 Hypothesis 2 
 The coefficient for R&D intensity in the version of Model 2 using abnormal returns from 
event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 10) provides a test of hypothesis 2.  This coefficient is           
-0.120 (p-value = 0.588), and therefore does not provide positive and statistically significant 
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support for H2.  In the version of Model 2 using abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see 
Table 11), the coefficient for R&D intensity is 0.000815, again not providing positive and 
significant support for H2 (p-value = 0.996). 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 
The coefficient for physical capital intensity in the version of Model 3 using abnormal 
returns from event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 10) provides a test of hypothesis 3.  This 
coefficient is 0.0431, in the predicted direction, but not providing support for H3 at a generally-
accepted level of statistical significance (p-value = 0.177).  In the version of Model 3 using 
abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see Table 11), the coefficient for physical capital 
intensity is 0.000307, again positive, but not providing significant support for H3 (p-value = 
0.989). 
 
Hypothesis 4 
The coefficient for the interaction of R&D intensity and physical capital intensity in the 
version of Model 4 using abnormal returns from event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 10) 
provides a test of hypothesis 4.  This coefficient is 0.917, in the predicted direction but only 
providing marginal statistical support for H4 (p-value = 0.116).  In the version of Model 4 using 
abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see Table 11), the coefficient for the interaction of 
R&D intensity and physical capital intensity is 0.746, in the predicted direction but not 
supporting H4 at a generally accepted level of statistical significance (p-value = 0.176).   
 
Hypothesis 5 
The coefficient for advertising intensity in the version of Model 5 using abnormal returns 
from event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 10) provides a test of hypothesis 5.  This coefficient is 
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0.144, in the predicted direction but not supporting H5 at a generally accepted level of statistical 
significance (p-value = 0.632).  In the version of Model 5 using abnormal returns from window 3 
(-15, +1) (see Table 11), the coefficient for advertising intensity is 0.0751, again positive, but not 
supporting H5 at a generally accepted level of statistical significance (p-value = 0.810). 
 
Hypothesis 6 
 
The coefficient for the interaction of advertising intensity and R&D intensity in the 
version of Model 6 using abnormal returns from event window 2 (-20, +1) (see Table 10) 
provides a test of hypothesis 6.  This coefficient is -0.866, and therefore does not provide 
positive and statistically significant support for H6 (p-value = 0.874).  In the version of Model 6 
using abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see Table 11), the coefficient for the 
interaction of advertising intensity and R&D intensity is 0.281, in the predicted direction but not 
providing support for H6 at a generally accepted level of statistical significance (p-value = 
0.960).   
 
Hypothesis 7 
The coefficient for Labor intensity [my measure for the “existing stock of human capital” 
(ESHC) in H7] in the version of Model 7 using abnormal returns from event window 2 (-20, +1) 
(see Table 10) provides a test of hypothesis 7.  This coefficient is -0.561, opposite the predicted 
direction and statistically significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.063).  In the version of Model 
7 using abnormal returns from window 3 (-15, +1) (see Table 11), the coefficient for Labor 
intensity is -0.351, again opposite the predicted direction, but in this case not statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.132). 
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This initial robustness check of my regression results eliminates all of the findings I 
presented in Tables 5 and 6, particularly those related to the interaction of R&D intensity and PC 
intensity (Model 4), and also advertising intensity (Model 5).  This elimination of my findings 
could be exposing a sample bias in my original regression analysis (see Tables 5 and 6) created 
by the missing data.   But additional systematic differences among the observations (observations 
in each model for which zeros were, and were not, added) could also contribute to the lack of 
results in this initial robustness check 
 To control for possible systematic differences between observations for which zeros 
were, or were not, added in each model, I run an additional robustness check.  Dummy variables 
are added to the initial robustness check to control for whether an observation had missing R&D 
or advertising data for which a zero was substituted.  Results for this additional robustness check 
are presented in Tables 12 and 13. 
 While, in general, the results in this additional robustness check are similar to the initial 
robustness check and less significant than the original regression results presented in Tables 5 
and 6, there are a few points worthy of mention.  First is that, for Model 4 in Table 12, the 
addition of the dummy control variables increased the coefficient for the interaction term for 
R&D intensity and Physical capital intensity (for results at the 20-day window:  see Tables 10 
and 12).  In the initial robustness check (see Table 10), the coefficient for the interaction term in 
Model 4 was 0.917 with a p-value of 0.116.  But, with the additional of the dummy variables in 
the additional robustness check (see Tables 12 and 13), this coefficient increased to 0.993 (Table 
12), with the p-value nearly reaching the 10% level of statistical significance (p-value = 0.106).  
Also of interest in the results for the additional robustness check with dummy variables presented 
in Table 12 is the observation that the coefficient for the R&D dummy is statistically significant 
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in five of the models.  This provides substantial evidence that there are systematic differences 
between observations in a given model for which zeros have, and have not, been added that go 
beyond R&D and advertising reporting or investing behavior. 
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Appendix Table 10:  Regression Results (20-day window) – [missing R&D and Advertising values have been replaced with 0]  
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 Model 5 Model 6a Model 6 Model 7 
Independent Variables          
R&D Intensity  -0.120  -0.108 -0.286  -0.112 -0.104  
  (0.588)  (0.624) (0.272)  (0.628) (0.651)  
Physical Capital Intensity   0.0431 0.0444 0.0223     
   (0.177) (0.163) (0.478)     
R&D Intensity * Physical Capital Intensity     0.917     
     (0.116)     
Advertising Intensity      0.144 0.132 0.164  
      (0.632) (0.659) (0.668)  
Advertising Intensity * R&D Intensity        -0.866  
        (0.874)  
Labor Intensity         -0.561† 
         (0.063) 
          
Control Variables          
Firm Size -0.00314 -0.00258 -0.00596 -0.00541 -0.00468 -0.00275 -0.00226 -0.00197 -0.0195 
 (0.640) (0.706) (0.415) (0.475) (0.539) (0.690) (0.746) (0.799) (0.306) 
CorpLevel 0.0290† 0.0312* 0.0292† 0.0312* 0.0351* 0.0289† 0.0309* 0.0309* 0.0820* 
 (0.054) (0.034) (0.052) (0.034) (0.018) (0.055) (0.037) (0.036) (0.026) 
RlastYr 0.00216 0.00298 0.00419 0.00505 0.00386 0.00163 0.00244 0.00259 -0.0583 
 (0.891) (0.853) (0.802) (0.768) (0.821) (0.916) (0.878) (0.874) (0.106) 
2-digit SIC codes Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.00703 0.00429 -0.0916 -0.101 -0.0714 -0.00355 -0.00524 -0.00779 0.344 
 (0.888) (0.932) (0.238) (0.226) (0.389) (0.950) (0.926) (0.901) (0.123) 
          
Observations 219 219 211 211 211 219 219 219 66 
R-squared 0.300 0.301 0.315 0.316 0.320 0.301 0.302 0.302 0.542 
          
Robust p-value in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 11:  Regression Results (15-day window) – [missing R&D and Advertising values have been replaced with 0] 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 Model 5 Model6a Model 6 Model 7 
Independent Variables          
R&D Intensity  0.000815  0.0298 -0.115  0.00563 0.00310  
  (0.996)  (0.869) (0.586)  (0.975) (0.987)  
Physical Capital Intensity   0.000307 -4.69e-05 -0.0180     
   (0.989) (0.998) (0.404)     
R&D Intensity * Physical Capital Intensity     0.746     
     (0.176)     
Advertising Intensity      0.0751 0.0757 0.0655  
      (0.810) (0.811) (0.869)  
Advertising Intensity * R&D Intensity        0.281  
        (0.960)  
Labor Intensity         -0.351 
         (0.132) 
          
Control Variables          
Firm Size -0.00675 -0.00675 -0.00906 -0.00921 -0.00862 -0.00655 -0.00657 -0.00667 -0.0246 
 (0.260) (0.285) (0.168) (0.190) (0.222) (0.285) (0.305) (0.351) (0.177) 
CorpLevel 0.00910 0.00909 0.00955 0.00899 0.0122 0.00900 0.00890 0.00889 0.0300 
 (0.388) (0.377) (0.355) (0.370) (0.227) (0.399) (0.396) (0.395) (0.223) 
RlastYr 0.00633 0.00633 0.00641 0.00618 0.00522 0.00606 0.00602 0.00598 -0.0617† 
 (0.681) (0.690) (0.693) (0.714) (0.758) (0.693) (0.704) (0.712) (0.096) 
2-digit SIC codes Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.0680 0.0680 0.0546 0.0570 0.0808 0.0625 0.0625 0.0634 0.306 
 (0.124) (0.138) (0.382) (0.407) (0.237) (0.222) (0.229) (0.282) (0.138) 
          
Observations 219 219 211 211 211 219 219 219 66 
R-squared 0.211 0.211 0.225 0.225 0.228 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.397 
          
Robust p-value in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 12:  Regression Results (20-day window) – [missing R&D, Advertising replaced with 0, and controls added] 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 Model 5 Model 6a Model 6 Model 7 
Independent Variables          
R&D Intensity  -0.0608  -0.0442 -0.232  -0.0618 -0.0637  
  (0.799)  (0.859) (0.409)  (0.798) (0.794)  
Physical Capital Intensity   0.0355 0.0364 0.0119     
   (0.277) (0.280) (0.718)     
R&D Intensity * Physical Capital Intensity     0.993     
     (0.106)     
Advertising Intensity      0.00865 0.0173 0.00997  
      (0.978) (0.957) (0.978)  
Advertising Intensity * R&D Intensity        0.221  
        (0.967)  
Labor Intensity         -0.683† 
         (0.053) 
          
Control Variables          
R&D Dummy (missing==1) 0.0410† 0.0394† 0.0325 0.0314 0.0347 0.0408† 0.0388† 0.0391† 0.196 
 (0.079) (0.099) (0.204) (0.230) (0.185) (0.063) (0.081) (0.074) (0.236) 
Adv Dummy (missing==1) -1.50e-05 0.000607 -0.00572 -0.00511 -0.00491 0.000218 0.00108 0.00125 -0.0599 
 (0.999) (0.967) (0.704) (0.748) (0.758) (0.990) (0.951) (0.944) (0.114) 
Firm Size -0.00184 -0.00160 -0.00483 -0.00464 -0.00374 -0.00182 -0.00157 -0.00163 -0.0131 
 (0.789) (0.819) (0.530) (0.561) (0.642) (0.794) (0.827) (0.835) (0.534) 
CorpLevel 0.0361* 0.0370* 0.0337* 0.0345* 0.0393* 0.0361* 0.0370* 0.0371* 0.0565 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.042) (0.042) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.116) 
RlastYr 0.000661 0.00118 0.00226 0.00272 0.00127 0.000656 0.00118 0.00114 -0.0572 
 (0.966) (0.941) (0.892) (0.875) (0.941) (0.966) (0.941) (0.944) (0.127) 
2-digit SIC codes Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.0235 0.0212 0.0531 0.0504 0.0447 0.0234 0.0210 0.0211 0.378 
 (0.778) (0.802) (0.586) (0.620) (0.662) (0.783) (0.809) (0.810) (0.149) 
          
Observations 219 219 211 211 211 219 219 219 66 
R-squared 0.306 0.306 0.320 0.320 0.324 0.306 0.306 0.306 0.556 
          
Robust p-value in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 13:  Regression Results (15-day window) – [missing R&D, Advertising replaced with 0, and controls added] 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 Model 5 Model 6a Model 6 Model 7 
Independent Variables          
R&D Intensity  0.0314  0.0799 -0.0671  0.0311 0.0253  
  (0.874)  (0.714) (0.782)  (0.876) (0.901)  
Physical Capital Intensity   -0.00429 -0.00594 -0.0252     
   (0.857) (0.815) (0.329)     
R&D Intensity * Physical Capital Intensity     0.778     
     (0.187)     
Advertising Intensity      0.00946 0.00509 -0.0171  
      (0.979) (0.989) (0.968)  
Advertising Intensity * R&D Intensity        0.668  
        (0.905)  
Labor Intensity         -0.438 
         (0.116) 
          
Control Variables          
R&D Dummy (missing==1) 0.0158 0.0166 0.00927 0.0113 0.0140 0.0155 0.0164 0.0173 0.104 
 (0.609) (0.603) (0.780) (0.742) (0.688) (0.604) (0.599) (0.585) (0.427) 
Adv Dummy (missing==1) -0.00160 -0.00192 -0.00956 -0.0107 -0.0105 -0.00135 -0.00178 -0.00129 -0.0426 
 (0.892) (0.879) (0.439) (0.436) (0.442) (0.925) (0.907) (0.931) (0.155) 
Firm Size -0.00625 -0.00638 -0.00894 -0.00929 -0.00858 -0.00624 -0.00637 -0.00656 -0.0201 
 (0.312) (0.323) (0.197) (0.204) (0.244) (0.322) (0.335) (0.365) (0.321) 
CorpLevel 0.0114 0.0110 0.00913 0.00776 0.0115 0.0114 0.0110 0.0112 0.0118 
 (0.327) (0.344) (0.442) (0.513) (0.342) (0.328) (0.346) (0.352) (0.576) 
RlastYr 0.00565 0.00538 0.00516 0.00434 0.00321 0.00564 0.00538 0.00526 -0.0608 
 (0.711) (0.733) (0.748) (0.797) (0.850) (0.712) (0.734) (0.744) (0.109) 
2-digit SIC codes Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.0985 0.0996 0.144 0.149 0.144 0.0983 0.0996 0.0999 0.416† 
 (0.216) (0.221) (0.110) (0.114) (0.127) (0.223) (0.229) (0.234) (0.090) 
          
Observations 219 219 211 211 211 219 219 219 66 
R-squared 0.212 0.213 0.227 0.227 0.231 0.212 0.213 0.213 0.407 
          
Robust p-value in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
 
